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I. Introduction
[In the wake ofLopezJ [t/his is not the first occasion on which this Court
has agonized over the propriety of the gambit of prosecuting criminal
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conduct which has historically and traditionally been prosecuted under the
state system as a federal crime in order to maximize punishment.I
The "agon[y]" of the Fifth Circuit played itself out in United States v.
Hickman.' After Hickman admitted to participating in a series of robberies in
the Beaumont, Texas area, a federal jury convicted him of six separate viola-
tions of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, also known as the Hobbs Act.' In March 1997, the
district court sentenced Hickman to 3,180 months imprisonment, or about 265
years.4 On appeal, Hickman claimed that the amounts he stole from the
businesses "were fairly trivial or that the businesses themselves only had a
minor role in interstate commerce."' Hickman cited United States. v. Lopez6
for the proposition that the government must show that each robbery had a
"substantial" effect on interstate commerce. 7
Before Lopez, a federal district court would have considered such an
argument a non-starter. And even after Lopez, very few district courts engaged
in serious discussion of re-examining the standard of review for interstate
commerce claims." So when the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated
that a "review of Supreme Court authority raises serious questions regarding
whether aggregation principles can be used as the Commerce Clause jurisdic-
tion hook under the Hobbs Act when the underlying crimes arise from a purely
I. United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2001), rehg en banc
granted, 281 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. 2002).
2. See United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing nexus
between local crimes and federal enforcement), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1203 (2000).
3. The Hobbs Act reads, in relevant part: "[W]hoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce ... by
robbery or extortion.., in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than twenty years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
4. Hickman, 151 F.3d at 453.
5. Id. at 456.
6. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
7. Hickman, 151 F.3d at 456; see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995)
(maintaining that, even under aggregation standard, guns in school zones did not have substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce). In Lopez, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional-
ity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A), a federal statute criminalizing possession of a gun or ammuni-
tion in designated "school zones." Id. at 551. Petitioner, charged under the Gun-Free School
Zones Act, challenged only the Act's constitutionality in his defense. Id. at 551-52. In a
decision surprising to many observers, the Supreme Court found that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2XA)
exceeded congressional power to regulate under the Commerce Clause because the prohibited
conduct did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 565. Further, the Court went
on to express deep concern over the encroachment of the federal government on the states'
police powers. Id. at 564.
8. See infra Part IV.B (discussing reluctance of federal courts to re-examine standard
jurisdictional analysis of federal robbery and arson statutes in light of Lopez).
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local crime spree,"9 the court signaled a new level of concern with interstate
commerce issues as applied in federal criminal statutes. Unfortunately for
Hickman, the Fifth Circuit declared itself bound by circuit precedent holding
that the Government need only prove aggregation to establish the jurisdictional
hook in a case involving such local conduct."
The Fifth Circuit found the facts in Hickman sufficiently disturbing to
order an en banc rehearing, which is the only method for overturning such
precedent in that circuit."1 A full sixteen-judge panel considered arguments
during the rehearing, and on June 21, 1999, the Fifth Circuit issued its deci-
sion. 2 The vote was a tie. Precedent stood. In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Higginbotham bemoaned the "ad hoc and random use of the Hobbs Act" and
the "dramatic reach of federal power."'3 But without further guidance from the
Supreme Court, such an argument could make little headway. Then came
Jones v. United States."4 This Note addresses whether the circuit courts have
used Jones correctly as a means to end judicial agonizing in cases like that of
Masontae Hickman.
In the years immediately following Lopez, there was an abundance of
judicial teeth-gnashing in some circuits, but little actual change. In 2000, the
9. United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 1998).
10. See id. (discussing concepts of aggregation and point at which aggregation of local
crimes has "substantial effects" on interstate commerce).
11. See id. (discussing Fifth Circuit requirements for overturning established judicial
precedent).
12. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (finding that tie vote precluded overruling of circuit
precedent set in United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1997), which established
strictly de minimis standard for Hobbs Act convictions); see also United States v. McFarland,
264 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2001) (bemoaning fact that prior circuit precedent mandated de
minimis standard when reviewing Hobbs Act prosecutions), reh 'g en banc granted, 281 F.3d
506 (5th Cir. 2002). On facts similar to those in Hickman, federal prosecutors charged
McFarland with four counts of violating the federal robbery statute after he committed four
robberies netting about $2,000. Id. at 557-58. McFarland robbed three gas stations and a liquor
store, waiting until he was the only customer in the store and then brandishing a gun. Id. A
federal jury sentenced McFarland to 1170 months, or about ninety-seven years in federal prison.
Id. at 558. Under Texas law, the jury could have sentenced him to as little as five years in
prison, with an absolute maximum of thirty years. Id.
13. Hickman, 179 F.3d at 243 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
14. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 859 (2000) (holding that, for purposes of
federal arson statute, residential arson does not fall within congressional jurisdiction). In Jones,
the Supreme Court considered the extent to which the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i),
covered the burning of residential property. Id. at 852-57. A federal district court convicted
Jones of burning his cousin's house, which was exclusively a residence. Id. at 851. The
Supreme Court found that exclusively private residences do not substantially effect interstate
commerce, even when receiving goods and services from out of state, and thus are not covered
under the statute. Id. at 858-59.
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Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Morrison" helped dispel the
notion that Lopez was simply a flash in the pan.'6 However, it was not until the
Court took up the case of Dewey J. Jones, accused of lobbing a Molotov
cocktail into his cousin's home, that the circuit courts received guidance in the
application of existing and regularly used federal criminal statutes. 7 Given the
strong language of Jones v. United States, the judicial ambivalence should
have abated. Unfortunately, through stubborn adherence to traditional modes
ofjurisprudence, many circuit courts still refuse to heed the Supreme Court's
call. This refusal to read the writing on the wall has left the circuits split over
the proper scope and reach of several federal criminal statutes. As a result, the
justice courts dispense through these laws remains uneven and possibly
unconstitutional.
This Note examines the effect of recent Supreme Court decisions on the
application of federal criminal statutes to traditionally state-prosecuted crimes.
Although this Note discusses the post-Lopez, pre-Jones wanderings of the
circuit courts, the primary focus is an analysis of the current application of
these federal criminal statutes. After a careful dissection of the Court's
unanimous decision in Jones, this Note considers the proper application of the
Court's teachings. This Note uses circuit court opinions regarding church
burnings as a method of exploring issues directly related to the holding in
Jones, but with a more expansive reach. This Note also employs the Hobbs
Act to illustrate the divergent opinions of the circuit courts, as well as to
demonstrate the potentially enormous impact of Jones on the daily conduct of
federal prosecutors.' In conclusion, this Note proposes combining the Su-
preme Court's two-part test in Jones with a rationality-in-aggregation standard
to reform the operation of the Hobbs Act. 9 Such a test would leave the Hobbs
15. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
16. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,627 (2000) (finding that elements and
effects of violence against women do not have sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to
sustain 42 U.S.C. § 13981, a provision of the Violence Against Women Act). In Morrison, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of providing a federal civil remedy for crimes
motivated by gender animus. Id. at 607. A college student brought such a suit against her
alleged attacker following a violent incident on the campus of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
Id. at 603. The Supreme Court found that the effects of violence against women on interstate
commerce were too attenuated for Congress to legislate in that area. Id. at 615-18.
17. The jurisdictional element of the federal criminal statute under which Jones was
convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 844, provides that "[w]hoever maliciously damages or destroys, or
attempts to damage or destroy, .. . real or personal property used in interstate or foreign
commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall [be subject to various
penalties].. .. " 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
18. See infra Part V (examining impact of Jones on validity of Hobbs Act prosecutions).
19. See infra Part VI (proposing application of two-part Jones test combined with
rationality-in-aggregation standard to reform Hobbs Act jurisdictional limits).
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Act intact and, hopefully, would allay the concerns of those who feel the cold
shadow of the federal government falling across plains traditionally occupied
by the states.
II United States v. Lopez
The 1995 decision in Lopez marked a turning point in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. For the first time since 1936, the Supreme Court struck down
a statute on the grounds that Congress exceeded its power to regulate interstate
commerce.2' Stating that there were "three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power,"21 the Court focused its
decision on the aggregation principle of the third category, the ability of
Congress to regulate "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce. '22 The Court went on to find that the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
18 U.S.C. § 922(c)(1)(A),' exceeded congressional power because the nexus
between the prohibited acts and interstate commerce as a whole was too
attenuated.24 Even in the aggregate, the Court found that the hannful effects
of guns in schools did not have a sufficiently substantial effect on interstate
commerce.' While the Court limited its holding to one specific statute, the
implications resonated throughout vast areas of federal law.
After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lopez, various commenta-
tors and scholars immediately began to reexamine their positions using the
20. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309 (1936) (holding act regulating price
of coal and setting number of hours for miners had only indirect effect on interstate commerce
and therefore was outside scope of congressional power). But see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1937) (proclaiming congressionally enacted labor laws valid
in spite of previous term's holding in Carter).
21. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-60 (1995) (discussing three avenues
through which Congress may regulate "commerce"). The Lopez Court understood these avenues
to be as follows: (a) Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce, such
as roads, railways, and waterways; (b) Congress may regulate the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, such as boats and airplanes, and persons or things in interstate commerce
(c) Congress may regulate activities that have a "substantial relation" to interstate commerce.
Id. This Note focuses exclusively on the substantial effects prong in the context of localized
criminal activity.
22. Id.
23. See Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993)
(criminalizing knowing possession of firearm in school zones).
24. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 ("Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic activity, no matter how broadly one
might define those terms.").
25. See id. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce.").
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Court's holding. Some saw Lopez as the first step in a gradual rollback of
congressional power to regulate "commerce."26 Most scholars, however,
argued that Lopez stood only as a minor speed bump in the road toward
increasing the federalization of crime. Noting that "the dominant theme of
this century has been the expansion of federal jurisdiction,"27 some commenta-
tors were quick to point out that as long as there are sensational crimes and
pervasive social problems to which Congress feels compelled to respond,
Congress will continue enacting statutes authorizing federal jurisdiction over
an ever-widening range of criminal conduct.2" Even those favoring a return
to a more restrictive form of federalism, at least in the context of traditionally
state-prosecuted crimes, noted that two Justices for the majority seemed to
suggest that simply retooling the jurisdictional hook would cure the constitu-
tional defect in the Gun-Free School Zones Act.
29
The Supreme Court left the lower federal courts to themselves in the
muddled aftermath of Lopez. The language of Lopez seemed to contradict
itself; the majority conceded that previous cases had given "great deference to
congressional action," but noted that the facts of the case did not warrant an
expansion of that deference.30 The Court offered no test other than suggesting
that courts base their examination on "what is truly national and what is truly
local."3 The lower federal courts generally followed one of two paths in the
period immediately following Lopez. Most circuit courts did little more than
mention Lopez while maintaining the barest of de minimis standards for
26. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite U.S. v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554,555-57 (1995) (suggesting abandon-
ment of current tests for Commerce Clause authority, asking instead, "Is there some reason the
federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot leave the matter to the
states?").
27. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforce-
ment Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 767 (1999). Richman goes on to argue that as federal
jurisdiction over criminal matters has expanded, so too have efforts by federal law enforcement
officials to limit expectations of federal power. Id. Ultimately, he feels that congressional
regulation in this field constitutes an abdication of the responsibility for deciding what should
and should not be subject to federal prosecution. Id. at 758.
28. See Susan A. Erhlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825,
825-27 (2000) (citing recent examples of such "news-driven" legislation, namely proposals to
criminalize allowing children to possess weapons and recent federal "cajacking" statutes,
passed after rash of such incidents raised awareness on Capitol Hill).
29. See Regan, supra note 26, at 560, 567-68 (criticizing Rehnquist opinion in Lopez for
being "unsatisfactory" and noting that Justice Kennedy and Justice O'Connor would consider
Gun-Free School Zones Act constitutional if Congress reworked jurisdictional elements to spell
out connection between guns in school zones and interstate commerce).
30. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
31. Id. at 567-68.
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criminal conduct prosecuted federally under a Commerce Clause theory."
However, a select few lower courts ventured into new territory.33 Both ap-
proaches offer insight into the direction the various circuit courts will take after
the Jones decision.
A quick examination of the circuits in which Lopez did not affect the
courts' reasoning proves helpful when viewed next to circuits willing to use
Lopez to deny federal jurisdiction over traditionally locally prosecuted crimes.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth
Circuits all reaffirmed their belief that the Government need prove only the
faintest of interstate commerce connections in Hobbs Act prosecutions.34 The
most influential of these cases, United States v. Bolton," used extremely
flexible aggregation theories to justify holding that money stolen from four
businesses and an individual, the potential use of which was the purchase of
goods moving in interstate commerce, satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites
of the Hobbs Act.36 The Court in Bolton relied heavily on the fact that, while
the Gun-Free School Zones Act contained no express jurisdictional hook, the
Hobbs Act's jurisdictional mandate is quite clear.37 Further, the Bolton court,
without explaining its reasoning, found that extortion and petty robbery
32. See United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836,843 (8th Cir. 1996) (reaffirming de minimis
standard as de facto standard for all Hobbs Act prosecutions); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d
396, 399-401 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 449-61 (7th Cir.
1995) (same). Bolton has emerged as the most cited case to support the proposition that Lopez
did not affect the Government's need to prove only a de minimis connection to interstate
commerce.
33. See infra notes 44-63 and accompanying text (discussing lower federal courts that re-
considered validity of de minimis standard in fight of Lopez).
34. Supra note 32.
35. 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).
36. See United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400-01 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that theft
of money to be used to purchase goods moving in interstate commerce exposed defendant to
federal charges). The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit considered whether the defen-
dant's theft of money to be used in interstate commerce could "affect" interstate commerce in
a manner sufficient to subject him to federal prosecution under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 399. The
defendant robbed four restaurants and one individual, absconding with less than five thousand
dollars total. Id. at 397-98. The Tenth Circuit found that the proper standard for judging
whether the defendant's crimes had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce was the de
minimis standard, a standard unaffected by the Supreme Court's decision in Lopez. Id. at 399.
Using theories of aggregation, the Tenth Circuit held that a showing of the slightest effect on
interstate commerce could, if repeated on a larger scale, substantially affect interstate commerce.
Id.
37. See id. (discussing jurisdictional elements in Hobbs Act as compared to Gun-Free
School Zones Act).
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inherently affect interstate commerce, whereas gun possession in a school
zone does not.3"
A. Post-Lopez State of Federal Arson Law
After Lopez, arson statutes generally were unassailable under the de
minimis standard. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its
application of the de minimis standard to federal arson statutes in United
States v. Rea. 9 In Rea, the Eighth Circuit found that the Government satisfied
the de minimis standard by proving that a church targeted for arson included
a Sunday school annex that purchased books from out of state.40  And in
Jones,41 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed
the conviction of Dewey Jones under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). 42 Although the
circuits making these decisions seemed to consider them rather elementary,
it is surprising that they did not engage in a more searching analysis before
affirming the convictions given the Supreme Court's federalism concerns in
Lopez.43  The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Jones proved these
decisions wrong or, at the very least, misguided.
38. See id. at 398 (finding that extortion inherently affects interstate commerce in ways
that guns in school zones do not).
39. 169 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1999). This case proves particularly enlightening because
the Jones decision examined the same statute and reached a contrary result.
40. See United States. v. Rea, 169 F.3d 1111, 1113-14 (8th Cir, 1999) (concluding that
church annex had sufficient nexus with interstate commerce under de minimis test because
congregation used annex as school, which in turn bought textbooks traveling in interstate
commerce), vacated, 530 U.S. 1201 (2000). In Rea, the defendant conspired to cover his
brother's theft of church computer equipment by burning the church annex from which his
brother stole the equipment. Id. at 1112. Defendant later admitted his involvement, but claimed
that the church did not use the annex in "interstate commerce or in any activity affecting
interstate commerce." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)). The Eighth Circuit found that
the loss of several items purchased in interstate commerce, including a piano, curriculum
materials, and religious literature, combined with the fact that several church members congre-
gated in the annex, was sufficient to establish connections with interstate commerce. Id. at
1113. Notably, the defendant appealed this decision after reading Jones. See United States v.
Rea, 223 F.3d 741,742 (8th Cir. 2000) (rehearing appeal in light of Jones decision). Following
the Jones decision, the Eighth Circuit decided to remand the case for further findings of fact to
determine whether the annex was "used in" commerce as defined by the Supreme Court in
Jones. Id. at 744.
41. 178 F.3d. 479 (7th Cir. 1999).
42. See United States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding federal arson
statute applicable to burning of purely residential dwelling).
43. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (noting that, when determin-
ing jurisdictional requirements in criminal matters, courts should determine what constitutes
national interest permissibly regulated by Congress and what constitutes local interest outside
congressional reach).
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A more reasoned post-Lopez approach to deciding federal jurisdiction
under the Commerce Clause came from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The first post-Lopez case decided on Lopez grounds involved the
federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)." The defendant in United States v.
Pappadopoulos" conspired with her husband and a friend to bum her own
home to collect the insurance payment. 6 The fact that the home received
natural gas from out of state constituted the sole interstate commerce nexus
presented by the Government.47  Quoting heavily from Lopez, the
Pappadopoulos court found that, because the function of the residence did not
involve any commercial enterprise and in light of the tenuous connection with
interstate commerce presented by the Government, the federal legislation
improperly intruded into a field traditionally occupied by the states.48 The
Ninth Circuit did not speak directly to the issue of the de minimis standard and
mentioned the issue of aggregation only in passing.49 The court summed up its
decision by saying that the offense in question was "a simple state arson crime"
44. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000); see supra note 17 (providing text of federal arson statute).
45. 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995).
46. See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no
nexus between crime of burning one's own home and interstate commerce). InPappadopoulos,
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a residential property owned by the defendant had
sufficient ties to interstate commerce as defined in the federal arson statute. Id. at 524-25. The
Government relied on the fact that the home received natural gas from out-of-state. Id. Further,
an out-of-state insurer insured the home and was the target of attempted insurance fraud. Id.
at 525-26. Finding only tangential and unsubstantial links to interstate commerce, the Ninth
Circuit held that federal prosecution of the defendant unconstitutionally intruded into the realm
of traditionally state prosecuted crimes. Id. at 530.
47. Id. at 528.
48. See id. at 527-29 (emphasizing that intrusion of federal criminal legislation into
traditional areas of state concern violated important and basic tenets of basic federalism); see
also United States v. Denalli, 73 F.3d 328, 331 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (reversing federal
conviction for arson of private residences because Government failed to prove that arson
substantially affected inteistate commerce). Although relevant, Denalli is of little probative
value as the per curiam decision fails to explain the reasons for the conclusions it draws. Id. at
330. In Denalli, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit cited both Lopez and
Pappadopoulos briefly, but did not address such issues as aggregation or the de minimis
standard. See id. at 329-30 (reciting holdings in Lopez and Pappadopoulos as relevant prece-
dent). More confusingly, the Eleventh Circuit mentioned and then dismissed the fact that the
victim often worked from home, producing documents for a company contracting with the
Canadian Government. Id. at 330-31. This case arguably is an awkward step in the right
direction, but one with little reasoning to guide its outcome.
49. See Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d at 528 (relying on principles of federalism while
ignoring deeper questions of how these principles should inform standards used in such
situations).
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and that "[it should have been tried in state court."50 Ultimately, the Ninth
Circuit reached a tenable conclusion in Pappadopoulos, but relied too heavily
on broad notions of federalism. Rather, the Pappadopoulos court should have
examined precisely what level of proof regarding the interstate commerce
nexus the Government must present in such situations.5
B. Post-Lopez State of Hobbs Act Law
Decided less than a year after Bolton, the Northern District of California's
decision in United States v. Woodruoff marked a radical departure from
traditional deference to a minimal jurisdictional showing in Hobbs Act cases.53
The defendant had robbed three northern California jewelry stores of approxi-
mately $618,000 worth of jewelry. 4 All store owners testified that they
purchased most of the stolen jewelry from out of state and that they served a
significant out-of-state clientele.5s However, in the face of this testimony,
District Judge Vaughn Walker refused to sustain the conviction, concluding
that the Government failed to show that the defendant's conduct "in the
aggregate, would lead to a substantial effect on commerce.""
The Woodruff court first concluded that, due to the decisions in Lopez and
Pappadopoulos, the de minimis standard no longer applied in the Ninth
Circuit. 7 In doing so, the court specifically identified and then rejected the
50. Id.
51. In many ways, one might characterize Pappadopoulos more as a.reaction against
overreaching federal statutes than as a studied and deliberate application of the law. Policy
reasons aside, it is important to focus on the exact articulation of the law in such cases.
52. 941 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
53. See United States v. Woodruff, 941 F. Supp. 910,928 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated, 122
F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding chief issue in Woodruff to be responsibility of state to
prosecute such crimes as local communities see fit and not leave such duty to unelected federal
judges and prosecutors). In Woodruff, District Court Judge Vaughn Walker heard the defen-
dant's claim that his jewelry robbing spree did not affect interstate commerce as contemplated
by the jurisdictional. language of the Hobbs Act. Id. at 918-20. Despite finding that the
defendant had taken over $600,000 worth of jewelry, composed predominately of materials
from without the state of California and intended predominantly for sale out-of-state, Judge
Walker agreed with the defendant. Id. at 929. Judge Walker based much of his decision on the
fact that the Government relied almost solely on aggregation principles to support its jurisdic-
tional argument. Id. at 922. Finding this line of reasoning no longer persuasive after Lopez,
Judge Walker granted defendant Woodruff's motion for judgment of acquittal. Id. at 930.
54. See id. at 914 (reciting facts leading to arrest and conviction of defendant).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 923 (finding Lopez and Pappadopoulos more persuasive than applicable
Ninth Circuit precedent, which applies only de minimis standard when making interstate
commerce jurisdictional inquiries).
1470
THE DEVIL IN U.S. v. JONES
holdings in Bolton, Stillo and Farmer, stating that the "application of the
Hobbs Act in the manner these courts have proposed is fundamentally incon-
sistent with Lopez.""8 The court further expressed its opinion that courts
maintained their acceptance of the de minimis standard to avoid the daunting
task of drawing boundaries between state and federal authority. 9 It is an issue
the court did not sidestep. Clearly, the Woodruff court accepted this challenge.
Recognizing the lack of judicial clarity surrounding federal criminal
statutes based on interstate commerce claims, the Woodruff court cited the
overarching need to articulate some type of standard to draw a line between
what is and what is not interstate commerce.' The court then took a unique
approach. Instead of finding guidance in a technical aspect of the law, like the
principle of aggregation or the substantial effects test, it chose the nebulous
concept of federalism to help delineate the line between federal and state
authority.61 Stating that "criminal activity that violates both state and federal
law should be prosecuted in state court unless a case for federal prosecution
has been made,"'62 the Woodruff court decided the case on policy grounds,
rather than on established Ninth Circuit precedent. Much of the court's
justification seems to come from the language in Lopez discussing the limits
of federalism in the criminal context.63
The Supreme Court probably would think it strange to derive a test for
interstate commerce connections from a general discussion of federalism
issues. But the Woodruff court's test raises an interesting question. Is a test
based solely on federalism viable after Lopez? More to the point, is it a test the
Supreme Court would entertain? Ultimately, the answer to these questions is
no, as weaknesses in the test are apparent.' A test based solely on principles
of federalism allows for far too much subjectivity and, applied on a national
58. Id. at 928.
59. Id.
60. See id. (noting need to "draw a line demarking the boundaries between federal and
state authority").
61. See id. at 928-30 (proclaiming that traditionally state crimes should be province of
states absent some compelling interest, such as highly sophisticated crimes or trials that may
unduly tax state resources).
62. Id. at 929.
63. See id. at 928 (noting that "states, not the federal government, 'possess the primary
authority for defining and enforcing criminal law"' (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 561 n.3 (1995)); id. at 928 ("When Congress federalizes what is traditionally considered
a state crime, it effects a 'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction.'" (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3)).
64. Not only did the Ninth Circuit vacate Judge Walker's decision, United States v.
Woodruff, 122 F.3d 1185, 1186 (9th Cir. 1997), but also the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Woodruff v. United States, 522 U.S. 1082 (1998).
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scale, would create even more confusion than exists already. But the Woodruff
court comes the closest of all lower federal courts to ascertaining the intent and
spirit of the Supreme Court after Lopez. Despite the fact that this decision
stood isolated for several years, the subsequent decision in Jones vindicated
the Woodruff court's opinion, as do the slowly changing attitudes of many
circuit courts.
Perhaps the most eloquent opinion opposing the maintenance of a de
minimis standard, or at least favoring the radical alteration of that standard,
comes from the dissenting opinion of Judge Higginbotham in United States
v. Hickman.65 Rarely cited because it has no precedential value, the opinion
outlines a test that insists upon rationality in aggregation.' This rationality
has bite; Judge Higginbotham would require Congress to "identify a non-
pretextual, rational basis for concluding that there are sufficient interactive
effects among activities to allow them to be aggregated."'6 Higginbotham's
opinion maintains that Lopez draws a line between national and local
interests, 68 and his rationality test stands the best chance of effectively identi-
fying that line. The opinion then applies its rationality-in-aggregation test to
the Hobbs Act and concludes that courts should declare the Act unconstitu-
tional.69 The fact that Judge Higginbotham came within one vote of changing
Fifth Circuit precedent to preclude the constitutionality of Hobbs Act convic-
tions stands as testament to the judicial discomfort with such federal statutes.
And that was before Jones.
III. Jones v. United States
Jones v. United States" originated in the Northern District of Indiana,
where federal prosecutors charged the defendant with arson,' making an
illegal destructive device72 and using a destructive device during and in
65. See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting) ("We would hold that substantial effects upon interstate commerce may not be
achieved by aggregating diverse, separate individual instances of intrastate activity where there
is no rational basis for finding sufficient connections among them.").
66. Id. at 242.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 243 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (suggesting striking all Hobbs Act
convictions as unconstitutional).
70. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
72. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f) (2000).
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relation to a crime of violence." Jones challenged only the arson conviction,
claiming that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) exceeded Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause.74 He urged the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to
follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in Pappadopoulos and the Eleventh
Circuit in Denalli, holding the arson of residential property to be outside the
scope of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)."
A three-judge panel unanimously declined to do so. Citing prior circuit
precedent established in United States v. Hicks,76 the Seventh Circuit panel
maintained its stance that Lopez had not changed the fundamental analysis of
arson statutes in relation to residences." Noting that Jones's argument was
"a tough row to hoe,"7 the panel used the aggregation standard to uphold his
conviction.7 9 The panel cited Hicks for the proposition that "proof of a small
effect" on interstate commerce is enough to allow congressional regulation
under the Commerce Clause."0 Further, the panel reaffirmed that "the residen-
tial housing industry is interstate in character""1 and went on to note that the
"non-commercial character of the torched building strikes us as irrelevant"
given the ties to interstate commerce through such things as the use of gas and
electricity, the use of out-of-state building materials, and the use of out-of-
73. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000).
74. See United States v. Jones, 178 F.3d 479,480 (1995) (outlining charges against Jones
and his claims and strategy on appeal).
75. Id.
76. 106 F.3d 187 (7th Cir. 1997).
77. See United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that federal
arson statute required only "some effect on commerce" and that both residential and commercial
structures satisfied such standard). In Hicks, a Wisconsin jury convicted the defendant of
setting fire to a restaurant in an attempt to collect the insurance proceeds. Id. at 188. On
appeal, the defendant argued that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) was unconstitutional in light of Lopez. Id.
The defendant argued that Lopez precluded all federal arson prosecutions for arsons not
"substantially" affecting interstate commerce. Id. Comparing the effect of the loss of one
restaurant to the seven-trillion dollar gross national product of the United States, the defendant
claimed that his crime had no more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Id. The
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Posner, disagreed. Id. at 188-89. The court
stated that the "aggregate effect of such arsons on commerce is substantial," noting that the
aggregate effects of an action are the ones that "count, in deciding whether an activity is within
Congress's power under the commerce clause." Id. In the course of affirming Hicks' convic-
tion, the Seventh Circuit went out of its way to distinguish and criticize the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Pappadopoulos. Id. at 189.
78. Jones, 178 F.3d at 480.
79. Id. at481.
80. Id. at 480.
81. Id.
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state insurance companies.8 2 The Seventh Circuit found these factors consti-
tuted substantial effects on interstate commerce. 3
The Seventh Circuit's rejection of Jones's argument seems fairly per-
functory. The court focused on the issue of whether courts should treat
residential arson differently from arson of commercial property. 4 The court
quoted Hicks extensively, dismissing Jones's argument that language in Hicks
that undermined his claims was mere dicta."5 Overall, the opinion runs less
than three pages and reveals no serious legal concern over any of the issues
raised.
Like the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court handed down a unanimous
decision in the case of Jones v. United States.86 Like the Seventh Circuit, the
Supreme Court's decision was relatively short and to the point. Unlike the
Seventh Circuit, however, the Supreme Court ruled for Jones, accepting his
argument that the federal arson statute could not reach the burning of a
residential establishment."7 Accordingly, the Court vacated Jones's 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i) conviction, leaving him with two other unchallenged convictions. 8
The Supreme Court focused the first portion of its discussion in Jones on
the language of the statute, namely the meaning of the word "used." Employ-
ing established rules of interpretation, 9 the Court defined the word "used,"
within the context of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), as "active employment. '° Under this
82. Id. (quoting Hicks, 106 F.3d at 189).
83. See id. at 481 (noting that arson committed by Jones was part of national scourge of
arsons costing millions of dollars in damages). The Seventh Circuit pointed to federal statistics
reporting a one-year total of 19,888 residential arsons out of 33,848 building arsons and
estimated that such fires cost the nation $280 million in collective losses in 1997. Id. The
Seventh Circuit further noted that these arsons affect gas and telephone lines and disrupt the
daily lives of the victims by forcing them to seek shelter in hotels. Id. The latter consequence
of arson convinced the Seventh Circuit that Congress may regulate such criminal activity
because the Supreme Court already had found it permissible for Congress to regulate the
conduct of hotels in Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). Jones,
178 F.3d at 481. The Seventh Circuit did not stop there, however, noting that arson "leads
friends and loved ones to travel from other states to give comfort to the victims, and so on." Id.
The possibilities are endless.
84. Id.
85. Id. at480-81.
86. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850 (2000).
87. See id. at 851-52 (reversing Seventh Circuit's judgment that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
reaches residential properties).
88. See id. at 859 (noting status of Jones's convictions and sentence).
89. See id. at 857 (noting that courts should not treat any statutory language as
"surplusage," especially when such language defines elements of offense).
90. Id. at 856.
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interpretation, the Court noted that the only "active employment" of the
property Jones burned was the day-to-day living of his cousin's family.9
While this may seem simple wordplay, the Court defined "use" in relation to
the property itself, rather than in relation to the effect the property had on the
outside world.' In other words, the Court found that to determine the "use"
of the property as contemplated by the statute, a court must consider only the
property's employment. Thus, it is no surprise that the Court rejected the
Government's argument that outside factors should define the term "use."
The Court considered and dismissed the claims that Jones's cousin and his
family "used" the residence to obtain a mortgage from an Oklahoma lender,
"used" the residence to obtain an out-of-state insurance policy, and "used" the
residence to receive natural gas from outside the state of Indiana.9" Once the
Court defined the statutory meaning of the term "use" to include only "active
employment" of the property, any argument relying on the secondary effect
of that property on external markets was certain to fail.
Noting the two methods of interpretation of the term "use" leads to a
weightier discussion of why the Court felt the Government's definition was
erroneous. The Court stated that the Government's interpretation of the
statutory language gave Congress an almost unlimited power to regulate under
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) because virtually all buildings receive utility or insurance
services from corporations with out-of-state connections.94 But, given the
extreme judicial deference to Congress in this area,95 why did the Court pick
this case to break with precedent? More importantly, does the Jones decision
signal a shift in the Court's thinking about the relationship of the Commerce
Clause and the congressional power to regulate crime?
In Lopez and Morrison, the Court overturned the Gun-Free School Zones
Act (GFSZA) and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), respectively,
in the former case on the grounds that findings of fact by Congress were
91. Id.
92. See id. (defining "use" of property burned as solely "the everyday living of Jones's
cousin and his family").
93. See id. at 855 (dismissing Government arguments concerning "use" of residence in
question that Seventh Circuit upheld as valid).
94. See id. at 857 (noting that under Government's "expansive interpretation of § 844(i),
hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain").
95. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,305 (1964) (finding that restaurant's use
of meat and mustard traveling in interstate commerce satisfied jurisdictional elements of Title
II of Civil Rights Act of 1964). For a basic overview of the aggregation doctrine, see Wickard
v. Flburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942) (holding that Congress may regulate individual farmer's
growth of wheat for purely private consumption on grounds that such consumption, when
aggregated throughout entire economy, implicates interstate commerce).
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insufficient to establish a nexus with interstate commerce, and in both cases
on the grounds that the statute lacked the requisite jurisdictional elements to
give Congress the power to regulate the subject matter.9 6 More importantly,
the Court in both cases signaled its unease with legislation based on an
aggregation theory that would give Congress virtually unlimited power to
regulate criminal activity.' Although it may seem that Jones is simply a
logical extension of Lopez and Morrison, Jones is distinguishable in three
important areas. First, the statute in question had a valid jurisdictional ele-
ment. Second, the Jones Court merely reinterpreted a long-standing statute
instead of striking down an untested one. Third, Jones marks the first time the
Court has relied almost solely on principles of federalism to guide its decision.
In Jones, the Court echoed the theme of contrasting what is "truly na-
tional and what is truly local"' g and elevated the notion from simple dicta to
a controlling principle of Commerce Clause interpretation. Justice Ginsburg
stated that the Court must interpret statutes in such a way as to avoid constitu-
tional questions" and, because she found that legislation giving Congress
virtually unlimited power to regulate arson would be unconstitutional, she
read 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) narrowly. Thus, the Court spared the statute the fate
of the VAWA and the GFSZA and deemed Jones's conviction, rather than the
entire statute, unconstitutional."° Although it may seem a basic proposition,
it is important to note that the Court used principles of federalism to justify its
contention that federalizing virtually all arson crimes would be unconstitu-
tional.
In support of the idea that the federal government may not constitutionally
criminalize residential arson, the Court stated that arson is a "paradigmatic
common-law state crime." '' This characterization further and perhaps defini-
tively distinguishes Jones from Morrison and Lopez. Neither VAWA nor
96. Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (finding no jurisdic-
tional element but sufficient, even excessive, legislative findings) with United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (finding both lack of jurisdictional element and insufficient congres-
sional findings to support legislation).
97. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (observing Court's inclination to reject "readings
of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise
a police power" (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-85)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("Under the
theories that the Government presents in support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any
limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where
States historically have been sovereign.").
98. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568.
99. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 858 (noting constitutional avoidance doctrine).
100. Id. at 859.
101. Id. at 858.
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GFSZA regulated crimes traditionally thought to fall exclusively under state
control. The VAWA regulated "gender motivated violence,"'1"c and the
GFSZA regulated possession of a weapon in a school zone. 3 Although one
might view crimes of violence and possession of weapons as matters of tradi-
tional state interest, both Acts elevated such activities to new and previously
unknown criminal activities through the inclusion of an intent element in the
Violence Against Women Act and an element based on locale in the Gun-Free
School Zones Act."°4 Thus, if the Court recognizes these statutes as creating
new forms of criminal activity, the argument against such statutes cannot
legitimately rely on a theory that the statutes intruded on an area of "tradi-
tional" state interest. Further, Justice Ginsburg omitted the discussion of
economic versus non-economic effects as a determining factor when deciding
whether Congress may regulate under the substantial effects and aggregation
theories. In both Lopez and Morrison, the Court expended much judicial
energy on just such a discussion.0 5 Justice Ginsburg's omission of this
discussion indicates that Jones, while relying onMorrison and Lopez for much
of its reasoning, is fundamentally different from either case. This fundamental
difference arises from the fact that Jones committed a traditional "common-law
state crime."'' 6 That realization colors much of the rest of this Note.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (c) (1994) (defining offense as committing "a crime of violence
motivated by gender"); id. § 13981(dXl) (defining crime of violence motivated by gender as
one "due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender"); United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) exceeded congressional
power under Commerce Clause).
103. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2XA) (2000) (making it federal offense to knowingly possess
firearm "at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q)(2)(A) exceeded congressional power under Commerce Clause).
104. It is arguable that the Supreme Court recognizes the possession of a weapon as
primarily a federal, not state, interest given prior rulings affirming the constitutionality of
federal "felon in possession" laws. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (finding
felon-in-possession statute valid provided that Government shows "requisite nexus with
interstate commerce"). However, the Lopez Court found that the coupling of such a concept
with gun-carrying non-felons and local schools, perhaps the purest example of an area of
traditional state concern, impermissibly strained the bounds of federalism. See Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 559-61 (holding that Gun-Free School Zones Act exceeded congressional power under
Commerce Clause).
105. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-11 (discussing implications of regulating non-commer-
cial activity under Commerce Clause, and noting that when courts have upheld federal regula-
tion of intrastate activity, "the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor");
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce.").
106. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 858 (rejecting federalization of "paradigmatic" state crime of
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Lastly, the Supreme Court offered a simple two-part test to guide lower
courts in determining whether the arson of property violates 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i).10 7 Courts first should look first to the function of the building (its
"use") and then should examine whether that function affects interstate
commerce.'08 The Court first drew this test from United States v. Ryan,109 in
which Chief Judge Arnold of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
dissented with respect to the connection between a permanently closed fitness
center and interstate commerce.1 Finding that the gym was no longer "a
going concern" due to financial reasons, Judge Arnold dismissed the facts that
an out-of-state interest owned the gym and that the gym received natural gas
from out of state."' He then offered a test to determine when such buildings
are subject to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i); courts first should make an inquiry "into the
function of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that
function affects interstate commerce."'"2 The Supreme Court adopted this test
in Jones for use in determining the jurisdictional validity of federal arson
prosecutions.'
Before moving on to a discussion of Jones's future effect, it is important
to take note of both the opinion's author and its unanimity. Justice Ginsburg
arson).
107. See id. at 854 ("The proper inquiry, we agree, 'is into the function of the building
itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce."' (quoting
United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993))).
108. Id.
109. 9 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 1993).
110. See United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 674-76 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., dissent-
ing in part and concurring in part) (dissenting with respect to Government's establishment of
sufficient connection between abandoned gym and interstate commerce). In Ryan, the Eighth
Circuit considered an appeal from a defendant convicted of setting fire to his permanently
closed fitness center in order to recover insurance proceeds. Id. at 662-64. Two firemen died
in the fire, creating circumstances that formed the predominant basis of the appeal. Id. Judge
Arnold dissented from the majority's conclusion that the defendant used the building in
interstate commerce as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Id. at 673 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part). Stating that there was no showing that the defendant involved the
defunct fitness center in interstate commerce, Judge Arnold cast doubts on the validity of all of
the subsequent federal convictions under the statute. Id. at 674 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part). In his dissent, Judge Arnold stated that the Eighth Circuit should adopt
a two-part test based on the function of the burned building. Id. at 675 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting
in part and concurring in part). Based on his interpretation of prior Supreme Court decisions,
he offered the test the Court ultimately adopted in Jones. Id. (Arnold, C.J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
111. Id. at 674 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
112. Id. at 675 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
113. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 854 (adopting test espoused by Judge Arnold in Ryan).
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dissented in both Lopez and Morrison, so it is odd that the Court would
choose her to speak on a matter potentially more influential than either of
those decisions. In fact, all four of the Justices who dissented in both Morri-
son and Lopez (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer) joined in the Jones
opinion. One of the reasons that the Justices could come to a unanimous
decision was that, at its core, Jones was simply an interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i). If the majority had wished to declare the entire statute unconstitu-
tional, as in Lopez, then support for the decision almost certainly would have
weakened. Moreover, federalism enjoys favor from both factions of the Court
when it suits their needs.114 As the opinions in Lopez and Morrison demon-
strate, Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of both opinions, as well as Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas, are all comfortable using federalism
as a guiding principle upon which to base an opinion." And, in an unlikely
concurrence, Justice Thomas joined Justice Stevens to concur in Jones."6
Justice Stevens wrote to confirm his belief that federal preemption of state law
is presumptively suspect." 7 Concerned with the practical application of the
114. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When questions
arise about the meaning of state laws,.., it is our settled practice to accept the opinions of the
highest courts of the States as providing the final answers."). Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer dissented in Bush on the grounds that the Court should insulate the review of state
election procedures from review by federal courts in the name of federalism. Id. at 124-25
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority felt it proper for the federal courts to intervene in state
election procedures and interpret state law in the name of equal protection. Id. at 112-22. Such
conclusions seem at odds with preconceived notions of the respective Justices' judicial and
political philosophies.
115. Justice Thomas is so comfortable using federalism as a guiding principle that he
would use it as a basis for abolishing the substantial effects test altogether. See United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing "how far we have
departed from the original understanding [of the Founders' use of the word 'commerce']" and
detrimental effects of recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence on notions of federalism). Almost
as long as the majority opinion, Justice Thomas's concurrence criticized many New Deal
Commerce Clause cases and signaled his willingness to use federalism as a sword to strike down
the "blank check" of the substantial effects test. Id. at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring). Perhaps
more intriguingly, Justice Thomas predicted a full five years before Jones that the dissenting
justices in Lopez might be willing to reconsider the substantial effects test. See id. (Thomas,
J. concurring) ("Unless the dissenting Justices are willing to repudiate our long-held understand-
ing of the limited nature of federal power, I would think that they, too, must be willing to
reconsider the substantial effects test in a future case."). That future case turned out to be Jones,
at least to the extent that the Justices reconsidered the scope of the substantial effects test, if not
its overall viability. See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (describing substantial effects test as "rootless and malleable" and "inconsistent
with the original understanding of Congress'[s] powers").
116. Jones, 529 U.S. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (proclaiming well-established "presumption against
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decision, Justice Stevens noted that under the federal statute Jones would have
received up to thirty-five years in prison, compared to only ten years under
Indiana laws. 18 This, Stevens wrote, may "effectively displace a policy
choice made by the State.""' 9 Thus, in the context of intrusion by federal
criminal legislation into areas of traditional state control, the principles of
federalism appeal, at least in part, to the ideologies of all members of the
Court. The more conservative wing clearly would like to see a reduction of
federal intervention into state affairs, and the more liberal wing of the court
may, as Justices Ginsburg and Stevens did, find benefits in allowing states
some discretion to be more or less lenient toward criminals. Principles of
federalism are proving an attractive weapon with which to trim the creeping
tendrils of the federal government that threaten to intrude on traditional state
criminal concerns.
For all of Jones's language concerning state common-law crimes and the
distinction between what is local and what is national, its holding is fairly
narrow, 20 as if the Court desired to test new principles, but did not yet want
to build a sweeping opinion around them. The Court never articulated when
and how to apply these principles. For example, how does one determine
what constitutes "traditionally local criminal conduct?"'' How does Jones
affect the continued viability of the "substantial effects" test as articulated in
Lopez? More importantly, what standard should lower courts employ when
judging the effects of criminal conduct as it relates to interstate commerce?
Unfortunately, the language in Jones gives the lower courts a shove, but little
direction. The manner in which the lower courts interpret these issues will
affect wide swaths of federal criminal law, and it is difficult to overstate the
potential effects of Jones on federal prosecution of crime.
Speaking for the Court, Justice Ginsburg did not find it necessary to
define traditional state crime, although she used the concept freely throughout
the heart of her opinion.' Her reluctance to define such a concept leads to
the conclusion that either it is too amorphous to define properly or that it is so
obvious to any observer that it deserves no comment. For purposes of this
Note, the Court's naked declaration that "arson is a paradigmatic common-law
federal pre-emption of state law").
118. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. See id. (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) "covers only property currently used in
commerce or in an activity affecting commerce").
121. Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971)).
122. Justice Ginsburg's opinion uses the terms "common-law state crime" and "tradition-
ally local criminal conduct" interchangeably. See id. (applying same meaning to both phrases).
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state crime"'2 gives sufficient support to the subsequent treatment of arson as
a traditional state crime.
IV Post-Jones Church-Burning Prosecutions
An examination of lower courts' treatment of Jones should begin with
cases that do not involve residential arson, but that otherwise mirror the facts
of Jones as nearly as possible. Church burning fits this bill nicely. Churches
are neither purely residential nor strictly commercial. Their ambiguity serves
as a perfect test of a court's reading of Jones because it forces a court to
define what is "active employment" in interstate commerce. 24 The diversity
of types of churches further forces a court to spin out its reasoning when
explaining its holding.
A. Courts Acknowledging the Ideals of Jones
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit captured the spirit of Jones in
United States v. Johnson.2' In November 1999, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
conviction of Robert Earl Johnson, accused of burning a Methodist church in
Hopewell, Texas. 26 The fact that he entered a conditional plea of guilty
complicated matters for Johnson. After conviction, he retracted his plea,
claiming that the Government had charged him erroneously with a federal
crime. 12 Citing Lopez, Johnson argued that his crime did not have "substan-
tial impact on interstate commerce," an argument the Government used the
aggregation theory to resist.2 8 The Fifth Circuit found the four facts that the
123. Id.
124. Id. at 856.
125. See United States v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 657, 659-61 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated, 530
U.S. 1201 (2000), aff'd on reh g, 246 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that factual basis of
defendant's plea failed to reflect necessary connection to interstate commerce and subsequently
vacating plea). The Fifth Circuit in Johnson examined the connection between church property
and the jurisdictional hook of the federal arson statute. Id. at 659-60. Johnson pleaded guilty
to burning a one-story church to destroy evidence of prior thefts of church property. Id. at 658.
He later sought to withdraw his plea, arguing that the factual basis for the plea was insufficient
to establish a constitutionally-significant effect on interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i). Id. at 659. The Fifth Circuit agreed, finding that the Government failed to present any
information relating the activities of the church to participation in a judicially cognizable level
of interstate commerce. Id. at 662-63.
126. See id. (vacating Johnson's conviction).
127. Id. at 660.
128. See id. (discussing continued viability of aggregation theory with respect to substan-
tial effects test). It also is important to note that the Fifth Circuit found 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
"strikingly similar" to the Hobbs Act federalization of certain types of theft. Id. at 661. The
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Government relied upon insufficient to establish a nexus with interstate
commerce.'29 In support of its position, the Government argued that out-of-
state church members paid tithes, that the church was a member of a national
religious organization, that the church disseminated its funds to out-of-state
causes, and that an out-of-state insurer paidthe church's claim. 3' The Fifth
Circuit concluded that none of these facts entailed an "explicit connection or
effect upon interstate commerce."'' The Johnson court found that the Govern-
ment's best evidence was that of the insurance payment by an out-of-state
insurer, but even that did not have more than a "speculative" effect on inter-
state commerce.'32 Thus, using the clearly erroneous standard, the court
vacated Johnson's guilty plea and remanded the case.'33 The Government
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and
remanded the case for review in light of the intervening decision in Jones."'
In reaffirming the original vacation of Johnson's sentence, the Fifth Circuit
apparently believed that the Supreme Court had vindicated its original deci-
sion,' 35 and added only a brief mention that the Government failed to present
any evidence regarding whether the church was "being actively employed for
commercial purposes."36
The Western District of Tennessee took a different approach to Jones.
In United States v. Raybo'n,37 the court read Jones to contain a two-part test:
Was the property "actively used" in interstate commerce, and if not, did the
building by itself substantially affect interstate commerce?13 Although the
court concluded that because the Fifth Circuit uses the aggregation theory in Hobbs Act cases,
it is permissible to use aggregation in federal arson cases. Id. In a special concurrence by Judge
Garwood, two judges took issue with the aggregation theory as applied to 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).
See id. at 664 (Garwood, J., concurring) ("[A]rsons under section 844(i) are simply not a
meaningful 'class of activities' suitable for aggregation.").
129. See id. at 662 (discussing burned church's connection to interstate commerce).





134. United States v. Johnson, 530 U.S. 1201 (2000).
135. See United States v. Johnson, 246 F.3d 749, 752 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that nothing
in Jones is inconsistent with, or suggests prior error in, Fifth Circuit's prior decision in case).
136. Id.
137. 138 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Tenn. 2001).
138. See United States v. Raybom, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031-35 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)
(devising two-part test based on functionality of building in relation to interstate commerce).
In Rayborn, the Western District of Tennessee considered the functional aspects of a church,
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Jones opinion does not mention this test, the Rayborn court called this the
"function test.' 39 Using this test, the court vacated the federal conviction of
a pastor for the burning of his own church." The court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that, because the church bought several service trucks from
out of state and used building material from out of state, the church "actively
engaged" in interstate commerce.'4 Such factors, the court noted, "have no
bearing on [the church]'s actual function." '42 Applying the second prong of
its function test, the court held that the church, even though it maintained a
low level radio station that broadcast gospel programming to various neigh-
boring states, did not engage in any activity affecting interstate commerce.' 43
The court carefully noted, however, that these broadcasts were of church
sermons only and that the radio station did not sell advertising.TM Further, the
Rayborn court echoed the Supreme Court's focus on local and national
concerns.1
45
Although drawing from Jones a "test" the Supreme Court never specifi-
cally named, the Rayborn court was faithful to the spirit of Jones. Indeed,
given the straightforward wording of Jones, such church burning decisions
burned by the defendant, that the Government claimed satisfied the jurisdictional elements of
18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Id. at 1032-33. Evidence of such a connection included the fact that the
church, located in Tennessee, served congregants from Mississippi and Arkansas, collected an
average of $9000 a week in donations, and ran a low-level radio station. Id. at 1031. Using a
two-part test crafted from the language of Jones, the Rayborn court found such contacts simply
too minimal to establish a connection with interstate commerce and dismissed the defendant's
federal arson indictment. Id. at 1036.
139. Id. at 1032.
140. Id. at 1036.
141. Id. at 1034. Compare id. (listing possible connections with interstate commerce such
as collection of tithes, operation of radio station and organization of picnics) with Jones, 529
U.S. at 853-55 (listing possible connections with interstate commerce, such as retaining out-of.
state insurance and paying for natural gas delivered from out of state). Rayborn presented
variations on the facts presented in Jones, but the Rayborn court devoted more attention to
aggregation issues than the Supreme Court did. See Rayborn, 138 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (explain-
ing that multiplying church's activities on national scale would not raise criminal activity to
level of"substantially affecting interstate commerce").
142. Id. at 1034.
143. See id. at 1031, 1035 (noting that station broadcast into Arkansas and Mississippi, but
finding that such activities were minor and secondary to church's primary noncommercial
function).
144. Id. at 1036.
145. See id. at 1034 (noting that Supreme Court in Jones regarded respect for local and
national concerns as guiding principle).
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should be fairly simple. 46 Unfortunately, most of the lower courts that have
considered the question have chosen to ignore the spirit of Jones.
B. Courts Misreading Jones
Before Jones, the Supreme Court expressed concern with the propriety of
including churches under the umbrella of the federal arson statute. 47 The first
post-Jones circuit court decision addressing church burnings came from the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Grassie45 The
petitioner, motivated by religious animus, defaced four Roswell, New Mexico
churches belonging to the Latter Day Saints sect and burned one to the
ground.149 At trial, Grassie stipulated that the burned church was "engaging in
activities affecting interstate commerce"'5 and thus did not challenge the
146. Cf. United States v. Odom, 252 F.3d 1289, 1297 (1 lth Cir. 2001) (reversing convic-
tions under -12 U.S.C. § 844(i) because Government failed to prove church "was used in or
affected" interstate commerce). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, faced with facts
similar to those in Rayborn, turned to Jones for guidance when determining whether the
Government adequately proved a connection with interstate commerce. Id. at 1294. In Odom,
the Government relied on the fact that the burned church received donations from two out-of-
state donors, bought a "handful" of Bibles from out of state, and was an in-state member of a
church organization with out-of-state ties. Id. at 1296-97. The Eleventh Circuit articulated the
two-part test of Jones, but added a third element, namely whether the "commerce in which the
building is involved sufficiently affects interstate commerce." Id. at 1294. Under this test, the
court found that the Government failed to prove a connection between the burned church and
interstate commerce. Id. at 1296-97. This third element of the test creates serious problems in
the application of the test. First, the third element confuses the line between the building itself
and the function of the entity using the building. Should the inquiry be whether the actual
burned church affects interstate commerce, or should the inquiry focus on whether the function
of churches affects interstate commerce? Second, assuming that the court finds that the inquiry
should be into the effect of the actual burned church on interstate commerce, the third element
leads the court right back down the same road that ends in muddled theories of aggregation and
de minimis standards. The third element effectively negates the first two elements of the Jones
test.
147. See Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 860-61 (1985) (discussing legislative
history indicating congressional intent to cover church property under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
However, the Russell Court went on to note that "[bly its terms, .. . the statute only applies to
property [here, in the context of churches] that is 'used' in an 'activity' that affects commerce."
Id. at 862. This would indicate that the Supreme Court desired to restrict the reach of the
federal arson statute long before it had the opportunity to speak to the issue in Jones.
148. See United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding
church to be charitable organization with substantial connections to interstate commerce), cert.
denied, 533 U.S. 960 (2001).
149. See id. at 1202 (detailing offense committed by petitioner before his arrest).
150. Id. at 1204.
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interstate commerce connection."' However, after reading Jones, Grassie
appealed his sentence, arguing that the evidence presented against him was
insufficient to support a finding that the church actively engaged in interstate
commerce.' The Tenth Circuit disagreed, citing the case of Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison"53 for the proposition that the
Commerce Clause applies to charitable and nonprofit entities, bringing them
within the scope of the federal arson statute.' 54 The court's apparent reasoning
was that because the Supreme Court has applied the Commerce Clause to
nonprofit entities, it is not necessary to engage in further inquiry into a
church's connection with interstate commerce.' While such a reading of
Campus Newfound is not illogical, a more accurate reading is that a nonprofit
may, but will not necessarily, have interstate commerce connections sufficient
151. See id. at 1204-05 (outlining petitioner's defense strategy). The Tenth Circuit opined
that the reason Orassie chose to stipulate to the interstate commerce connection was that he
wished to avoid testimony by church members as to the worth of their place of worship. See
id. at 1210 (noting that "the stipulation was clearly a tactical decision by the defense to avoid
having the jury hear extensive and doubtless emotionally charged testimony"). If this assump-
tion is correct, it raises further questions regarding the inherent fairness of forcing a defendant
to choose between subjecting himself to such testimony and defending himself from a poten-
tially extra-constitutional federal arson charge.
152. Id. at 1207.
153. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
154. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584 (1997)
(finding that, because charitable and nonprofit organizations are major participants in interstate
market for goods, their activities come within scope of Commerce Clause). In Camps New-
found, the Supreme Court considered whether a Maine statute exempting local charitable
institutions from property tax violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 568. A nonprofit
organization failed to qualify for the tax exemption because 95% of its campers were from out
of state, and the organization filed suit. Id. at 567-61. The Supreme Court found that the statute
violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it favored nonprofit organizations serving in-
state campers over those serving primarily out-of-state campers. Id. at 584. More importantly
for this discussion, the Supreme Court found, as a basis for its judgment, that because nonprofit
and charitable organizations constitute a major percentage of the market for goods and services
moving in interstate commerce, they are subject to Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 583-85.
The Rayborn court cited Camps Newfound in its opinion as well, noting that the church at issue
ran a children's summer camp. United States v. Rayborn, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (W.D.
Tenn. 2001). The Rayborn court, however, correctly combined Camps Newfound and Jones
in its interstate commerce analysis, whereas the Grassie court simply avoided any meaningful
interstate commerce analysis at all. See United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1204-09 (10th
Cir. 2001) (omitting discussion of connection with interstate commerce of specific church
burned by defendant).
155. See Grassie, 237 F.3d at 1209 (suggesting that finding church subject to Commerce
Clause obviates need for deeper analysis into nature of church's connection with interstate
commerce). Lower courts should not read Camps Newfound as a per se rule that all nonprofits
automatically pass the interstate commerce test.
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to support federal jurisdiction."5 6 This principle does not, however, obviate the
need for a court to scrutinize these interstate commerce connections, some-
thing that the Grassie opinion fails to do. 57
The Tenth Circuit gave Grassie's claim cursory treatment at best, address-
ing the interstate commerce connection in a footnote. 5 ' Gathering information
from several encyclopedias,' 59 the Tenth Circuit listed the manner in which the
national organization of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
affects interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, its work in the areas
of genealogy, education, athletics, and "proselyting [sic]."'' The Tenth
Circuit never once mentioned the connection between interstate commerce and
the church that actually burned down.161 The court engaged in no discussion
of the "active employment" of the burned church. The court never mentioned
the difference between what is local and what is national. The brief discussion
of the church's connections to interstate commerce focused not on the property
that gave rise to the federal charge, but on the religious organization as a
national entity. This evidences a misreading of Jones and renders the interstate
commerce discussion worthless.
How, then, did the Grassie court err so badly on this issue? First, the
three judge panel may have given the defendant's initial stipulation undue
weight. As Judge Douglas stated in her examination of Grassie, because the
appellate standard of review favors the prevailing party, the court gave the
Government the benefit of the doubt as to whether the defendant's stipulation
that the churches engaged in interstate commerce meant that the congregations
"actively employed" them in interstate commerce. 62 Second, Grassie's acts
156. See Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 584-85, 586-89 (examining connections of non-
profit and charitable institutions with interstate commerce, but suggesting that such organiza-
tions may lack sufficient interstate commerce connections in some cases).
157. See Grassle, 237 F.3d at 1210 (concluding interstate commerce analysis with
comment that "nothing in Jones purports to limit Camps").
158. See id. at 1210 n.7 (relying on information found in encyclopedias to further discus-
sion on extent to which national organization of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
influences interstate commerce).
159. Id.
160. See id. (listing various national activities of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints).
161. Although the court briefly mentioned the churches that Orassie vandalized, it never
specifically discussed the burned church or examined its nexus with interstate commerce. Id.
at 1204. The court went on to list several items lost due to Orassie's acts, such as basketballs,
teaching equipment and sacerdotal accessories, and implied that, because the church "obviously
purchased [these items] in interstate commerce," no further inquiry into the nexus between the
crimes committed and interstate commerce was necessary. Id.
162. See United States v. Raybom, 138 F. Supp. 2d i029, 1035 (W.D. Tenn. 2001)
(speculating that in Grassie, defendant's stipulation that church engaged in interstate commerce
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were so extreme and motivated by such obvious religious hatred that the
Tenth Circuit may have felt obligated to impose the maximum sentence
possible.'63 Third, this may be a simple case of old habits dying hard. Per-
haps in the Tenth Circuit's experience, such attacks had no chance of success,
and it did not feel the need to upset established methods of judicial review
concerning such claims. Whatever the reason for the Tenth Circuit's decision,
one should criticize the court less for reaching a poorly reasoned decision than
for refusing to engage in'the correct type of analysis in the first place. Unfor-
tunately, the Tenth Circuit is not alone.164
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted Jones as well.
In United States v. Beck, 6 the Eighth Circuit refused to review a trial court's
acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea,'" including his admission that the
church he burned was "a building and activity which affected and was used in
interstate commerce." 67 The Eighth Circuit listed several facts as supporting
such a plea, namely that the church had 1400 members, housed a school, had
an affiliation with a national religious organization, and collected money that
it then donated to national and international ministries.' 6 Because the defen-
dant failed to enter a conditional plea, the court reviewed his claim under the
standard of plain error. 69 Without engaging in any type of Jones analysis, the
Eighth Circuit held that the trial judge had disposed properly of the case on the
influenced subsequent definitions of term "affected" in favor of Government).
163. See United States v. Orassie, 237 F.3d 1199, 1202 (10th Cir. 2001) (detailing
Grassie's systematic destruction of five Mormon churches, focusing on his elaborate, time-
consuming efforts to permanently destroy such buildings).
164. For a similar mistreatment of a church burning case, see United States v. Tush, 151
F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (D. Kan. 2001) (discussing similarities between churches burned by
defendants Grassie and Tush). In Tush, the court considered whether to uphold a guilty plea
after challenge when the defendant had stipulated the church's connection with interstate
commerce. Id. at 1248-49. The defendant argued that Jones created doubt as to the validity of
his plea, claiming that the church had only a "passing connection" with interstate commerce.
Id. at 1251. After conceding that the defendant was correct in stating that Jones precluded
consideration of the fact that the church purchased religious supplies from out of state to
establish a legitimate connection with interstate commerce, the court upheld the conviction on
the grounds that the church had out-of-state visitors and thus was "actively used" in interstate
commerce. Id. at 1253.
165. 250 F.3d 1163 (8th Cir. 2001).
166. See United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1167 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that trial
judge did not commit plain error in accepting guilty plea stipulating connection with interstate
commerce).
167. Id. at 1165.
168. See id. (listing facts that court found to support connection between burned church
and interstate commerce).
169. Id. at 1166.
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facts provided. 7' Had it engaged in a Jones analysis, the Eighth Circuit would
have noticed the similarities between the facts in Beck and Jones. Just as the
Supreme Court concluded in Jones that the Government could not claim that
one "used" a building in the "activity" of receiving natural gas, securing a
mortgage, or receiving an insurance policy, 7' the Eighth Circuit should have
understood that one cannot "use" a church in the "activity" of national affilia-
tion, of fund disbursement, or of gathering its members, none of whom were
from out of state.'7 2 Arguably, the facts that the church housed a school and
that it distributed funds to out-of-state entities could support a connection with
interstate commerce, but it would have been necessary for the trial court to
apply a Jones analysis to these factors. Without complete information as to the
nature of the church's interstate dealings, the Eighth Circuit should have
remanded the case to the trial judge for further findings of fact to determine
whether plain error had occurred. Neither the trial court nor the Eighth Circuit
engaged in any type of Jones analysis when deciding Beck."' Both ignored the
Supreme Court's concerns with federalism in their cursory examination and
subsequent affirmation of the defendant's conviction, exactly the type of
situation the Court hoped to avoid.
In United States v. Rea,'74 only months before Beck, the Eighth Circuit
reached a decision supportable under the framework of Jones.' Working in
tandem with his brother, the defendant in Rea burned a church to destroy
evidence of his prior theft of a church computer. 7 6 After his brother agreed to
cooperate with the Government, the defendant entered a conditional plea of
guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to
dismiss the indictment on subject matter grounds)" On facts similar to those
discussed in Jones, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the church's use of
170. See id. (finding that neither of defendant's contentions "support a finding of plain
error").
171. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 857-59 (finding Government's contention that one could "use"
home in "activity" of receiving natural gas, mortgage, and insurance was inconsistent with
congressional intent underlying 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
172. See United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1165 (8th Cir. 2001) (listing factors
relating to interstate commerce analysis considered by trial court).
173. See id. at 1164-67 (declining to reference analysis of interstate commerce claims
under reasoning outlined by Supreme Court in Jones).
174. United States v. Rea, 223 F.3d 741 (8th Cir. 2000).
175. See id. at 744 (analyzing defendant's claim that Jones required review of whether
church he burned maintained sufficient ties to interstate commerce). The Eighth Circuit decided
Rea on May 18, 2000, less than three months before the filing of Beck on August 11, 2000.
176. See id. at 742-43 (discussing circumstances of criminal activity of defendant in
relation to burned church).
177. See id. at 743 (discussing procedural history in Rea).
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materials purchased in interstate commerce and its use of natural gas from an
out-of-state source did not constitute a sufficient connection with interstate
commerce. 7 " The Supreme Court had previously granted the defendant's
petition for writ of certiorari 79 and remanded the case, after which the Eighth
Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction.8 ° Given the facts of the case, a
remand for review in light of Jones was the correct result.' More impor-
tantly, the Eighth Circuit correctly applied the two-part test of Jones to reach
its result, examining the function of the building itself and then determining
whether that function affected interstate commerce.8 2 The difference between
Rea and Beck is that defendant Beck failed to enter a conditional plea, subject-
ing him to the higher burden of "plain error" to attain a reversal.' In light of
the difference between federal and state prosecution and the Supreme Court's
concern with federalism, the Eighth Circuit erred in not reversing defendant
Beck's claim, especially as it correctly articulated the test for such cases a few
months earlier in Rea. Such mistakes point not only to the confusion created
by extending Jones beyond its immediate context, namely the burning of a
residential property, but also to federal judicial reluctance to comply with the
strong spirit of federalism underlying Jones.
V Post-Jones Hobbs Act Prosecutions
A. Background
Rea not only provides an example of the correct application of Jones to
arson cases, but also it provides an avenue to begin the exploration of much
178. See id. at 743-44 (finding that Government failed to establish jurisdictional element
of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
179. See United States v. Rea, 530 U.S. 1201 (2000) (granting certiorari and remanding
case for rehearing in light of Jones). The Eighth Circuit then remanded the case to the trial
judge for further findings of fact. United States v. Rea, 223 F.3d 741,744 (8th Cir. 2000). The
trial judge, using principles culled from Jones, determined that the church had a substantial
impact on interstate commerce. See United States v. Rea, No. Crim. 97-235, 2001 WL 407238
(D. Minn. Apr. 18,2001) (reinstating federal criminal conviction).
180. See United States v. Rea, 223 F.3d 741, 744 (D. Minn. 2001) (reversing Rea's
conviction and remanding case for further findings of fact in light of Jones).
181. The facts of Rea mirrored those in Jones in that the Government in Rea relied on
evidence that the burned church annex "received" out-of-state books and computer equipment
and that church groups "used" the annex as a gathering place. See United States v. Rea, 169 F.
3d 1111, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999) (listing Government evidence of connection with interstate
commerce).
182. See United States v. Rea, 223 F.3d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying interstate
commerce analysis outlined in Jones in church burning context).
183. See United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding that
under "plain error" standard, reversal was inappropriate).
1489
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1461 (2002)
wider extensions of Jones. While certain instances of arson, especially the
burning of churches, certainly warrant the attention of the federal justice
system, convictions under federal arson statutes constitute only one-tenth of
one percent of all federal convictions.1 4 For 1999, the most recent year for
which data is available, this works out to exactly 168 offenders, placing arson
in the same category as bribery (165 convictions) and forgery (128 convic-
tions)."' Thus, while the holding in Jones is important, the infrequency of
arson prosecutions limits Jones's direct effect on the federal criminal justice
system. However, Jones clearly influences the interpretation, if not the consti-
tutionality, of other federal statutes that federal prosecutors utilize more often.
One such statute employed by federal prosecutors across the country is
18 U.S.C. § 1951, the federal robbery statute, otherwise known as the Hobbs
Act.186 According to the Department of Justice, federal courts convicted 1656
defendants of robbery in 1999, representing 2.5% of all federal convictions." 7
Invoked approximately twenty-five times more often than 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i),'" the Hobbs Act represents an area of federal law enforcement far
more important in terms of convictions than the federal arson statute. Thus,
if lower courts interpret Jones to apply to Hobbs Act prosecutions, the impor-
tance of the Supreme Court's dicta and concerns expressed in Jones extend
beyond arson cases. And, given the similarities between crimes covered by
the Hobbs Act and those covered by 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the spirit underlying
Jones moves easily from the federal arson statute to the federal robbery
statute.
The Hobbs Act applies to "[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in
commerce, by robbery or extortion."'8 9 Compared to the federal arson statute,
which states that the statute applies only to property "used in" interstate
commerce,' the language of the Hobbs Act indicates that Congress intended
to invoke a broader range of its powers under the Commerce Clause. In light
of the Court's concern with federalism in Jones,' the question is whether this
184. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTIE STATISTICS,
1999, at 67 tbl. 5.1 (2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS].
185. Id.
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000).
187. FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 184, at 67 tbl. 5.1.
188. Id. at 67 tbl. 5.1.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2000).
191. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 858 (declaring that reading federal arson statute broadly
"significantly change[s] the federal-state balance" in negative manner).
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language is over-broad to the point of being unconstitutional, or whether there
exists an interpretation of this language that avoids such a problem. However,
by ignoring Jones altogether, several circuits have adopted a third, unfortunate
approach.
The language of the Hobbs Act presents circuit courts with several inter-
pretive problems when analyzing it in a post-Jones context. As the Supreme
Court stated in Jones, courts have an obligation to avoid constitutionally
dubious interpretations of statutes.1" In Jones, the Supreme Court refused to
interpret language broadly to avoid impermissible federal intrusion into areas
of traditional state concern, namely the exercise of states' police powers.
193
The Hobbs Act also affects the states' ability to exercise their police powers.
Indeed, given the Hobbs Act's broad jurisdictional hook and the relatively high
numbers of convictions under the Act,' the Hobbs Act arguably represents an
intrusion into areas of state concern even greater than the federal arson statute.
Writing for a unanimous Court in Jones, Justice Ginsburg stated that were
the Court to "adopt the Government's expansive interpretation of § 844(i),
hardly a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain.0
9 5
If courts gave such an expansive interpretation to the jurisdictional language
of the Hobbs Act, virtually every robbery, burglary, or petty theft would be
subject to federal prosecution, given that it is difficult to imagine any product
or service that does not "affect[] commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in commerce." 1" Fortunately, Jones and its predecessors teach the
lower courts how to avoid such unconstitutional constructions by outlining the
guiding principles of federalism to limit federal incursion into areas of state
interest" and by providing a simple two-part test to evaluate interstate com-
192. Id. at 851 (citing Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
193. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 860 (Stevens, J. concurring) ("[W]e should interpret narrowly
federal criminal laws that overlap with state authority unless congressional intention to assert
its jurisdiction is plain.").
194. See FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 184, at 67 tbl. 5.1 (comparing percent-
age of total federal convictions by offense in fiscal year 1999).
195. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 857 (noting that interpreting federal arson statute to include
virtually every building in United States would render statute unconstitutional because it would
exceed congressional powers under Commerce Clause and constitute impermissible infringe-
ment on states' police powers).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
197. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (noting that "Founders
denied the National Government [police powers] and reposed them in the States").
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merce claims. 9 ' The fate of the Hobbs Act hinges on the correct application
of these principles and tests.
Starting with the Lopez decision, the Supreme Court signaled that it would
give special attention to cases challenging the traditional role of the police
power. 99 In Morrison, the Court directly addressed the conflict between state
and federal police powers, saying that it could "think of no better example of
the police power, which the Founders denied the National government and
reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of
its victims."2" This passage serves as notice that the Court intends to defend
vigorously the line between state and federal police powers.2"' Both Lopez and
Morrison reference the noneconomic nature of a federal statute that the Court
ultimately found unconstitutional;. 2 Jones, for its part, interprets a federal
statute so that it does not apply to what the Court believes to be noncommercial
activity. 3 How, then, do the teachings of these cases affect federal prosecu-
198. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 854 ("The proper inquiry, we agree, 'is into the function of the
building itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce.'"
(quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part))).
199. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (finding that Government's
rationale supporting jurisdictional element of Gun-Free School Zones Act would, through use
of overly expansive definition of interstate commerce, grant Congress "a general police power
of the sort retained by the States"). In Lopez, the Supreme Court showed more concern with the
possibility of granting the federal government a police power through misuse of the Commerce
Clause than with the direct effect of overly broad statutes on the police powers of the states. Id.
The Court repeatedly noted that the Founders did not intend to give the federal government such
powers, but did not focus specifically on the negative effects such a power would have on the
police powers of the states. See id. at 566 ("The Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress
a plenary police power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation."). In his
concurrence, Justice Thomas picked up the same theme by outlining the Founders' notions of
the term "commerce" in detail, but neither he nor any member of the majority mentioned the
term "federalism" in connection with the idea of police powers. See id. at 585 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (detailing Founders' understanding of term "commerce" and how they intended its
use in Constitution).
200. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
201. See id. ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at
the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the
province of the States.").
202. See id. at 617 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (finding Gun-Free School Zones Act had
nothing to do with "'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise," thus falling out of reach
of congressional power to regulate commerce).
203. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 856 (holding "that an owner-occupied residence not used for
any commercial purpose does not qualify as property 'used in' commerce or commerce-affecting
activity").
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tions for the forceful stealing of money or goods, a crime that arguably has
direct and inseparable links to the flow of interstate commerce?
The answer is simple in theory, but difficult in application. Bearing in
mind the Supreme Court's strong language about the virtues of federalism,
lower courts should look first to the two-part test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Jones2" and apply its relevant provisions to situations in which
federal jurisdiction over common robbery is at issue. The Court in Jones said
that the proper inquiry was first "into the function of the building itself, and
then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce.1
205
Applying this test to the forceful stealing of money or goods, lower courts first
should consider the source of the money, namely whether the perpetrator stole
from an individual or from a business with ties to interstate commerce. An
examination of the source of stolen money, private or commercial, correlates
directly with Jones in that the Supreme Court's scrutiny of the federal arson
statute began with an examination of whether the structures burned were
purely residential or involved commercial activity. 26 Asking whether the
money in a Hobbs Act prosecution came from private individuals or from
businesses parallels the Supreme Court's concern in an 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)
prosecution with the type of structure burned.' T
Second, courts should consider the actual effect of the stolen money or
goods on interstate commerce. This satisfies the second prong of the Jones
analysis."° In other words, does the property taken have such a substantial
effect on interstate commerce as to warrant federal protection? And through-
out such deliberations, the lower courts should remember the Supreme Court's
warning that there must "be a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local.00
9
B. Robbery of an Individual
Some lower courts already have begun an examination of the source of
stolen property as the first part of a Jones-style two-part test. In United States
204. See id. at 854 (stating proper test to determine nature of burned building in context
of interstate commerce).
205. Id. (quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993)).
206. See id. at 854-56 (discussing how differences between private and commercial
property affect analysis of jurisdictional elements of federal arson statute).
207. Id.
208. See id. at 854 (finding that, after examination of "function" of property, courts should
consider "whether that function affects interstate commerce" (quoting Ryan, 9 F.3d at 675)).
209. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,567-68 (1995).
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v. Lynch,"' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered the effects
of the robbery of an individual on interstate commerce."' After carefully
considering the defendant's claim that the Government failed to establish that
the Hobbs Act gave federal authorities jurisdiction to prosecute the robbery
of a private individual," 2 the Ninth Circuit concluded that the federal govern-
ment indeed could prosecute the robbery of individuals, but only if the effect
on interstate commerce reached a certain threshold." 3 The court cited Lopez
for the proposition that the federal government may not "pile inference upon
inference" to achieve the requisite connection with interstate commerce21 4 and
echoed the Supreme Court's concern in Jones with federal infringement on
crimes traditionally prosecuted by the states.1 ' The Ninth Circuit took note
of the decisions of sister circuits that had considered the proper method of
analyzing the jurisdictional elements of Hobbs Act prosecutions for the
210. 265 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2001).
211. See United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that inquiry
into Hobbs Act jurisdiction parallels inquiry into limits placed on Congress by Commerce
Clause). In Lynch, the Ninth circuit reviewed a Hobbs Act conviction connected with a
particularly brutal crime. Id. at 759-60. With the help of a co-defendant, appellant murdered
a Nevada resident near his father's ranch in Montana, dismembered and burned the body, and
then used the dead man's ATM card to withdraw $5,000 from his account. Id. The State of
Montana originally tried and convicted Lynch on multiple counts, but the Montana Supreme
Court reversed these convictions, finding that a wiretap used by Nevada authorities violated
Montana law. Id at 760. Hoping that the Nevada wiretaps would be admissible in federal court,
federal prosecutors tried Lynch in federal court for violations of the Hobbs Act and for carrying
a firearm during a crime of violence. Id. The defendant appealed his subsequent conviction and
twenty-five-year sentence, claiming that the Government failed to establish federal jurisdiction
over the robbery of a private individual. Id. The Ninth Circuit adopted a test first articulated
by the Fifth Circuit for use in determining when the robbery of an individual rises to the level
of a crime substantially affecting interstate commerce. Id. at 762. The Ninth Circuit then
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to apply the newly adopted standard. Id.
at 764.
212. See id. at 760-61 (analyzing relationship of Hobbs Act to Commerce Clause).
213. See id. at 761-62 (noting that, in general, "the taking of small sums of money from an
individual has its primary and direct impact only on that individual and not on the national
economy"). In this case, because the victim was dead, the robbery did not even harm the victim,
although one could argue that the robbery harmed his heirs and estate.
214. See id. at 761 (noting that "[t]he de minimis effect standard, however, is not a means
for the federal government 'to pile inference upon inference"' (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
567)).
215. See id. at 761 ("[R]obbery and extortion, particularly of individuals, have traditionally
been the province of the states."). The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion after stating that
robbery, at first glance, clearly seems to fall within the category of activities that implicate
interstate commerce because it "involve[s] the forced transfer of currency or of goods that can
be exchanged for currency." Id.
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robbery of an individual216 and found that such circuits have employed two
different methods.
217
The Lynch court cited the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Wang21 as an example of a court distin-
guishing the robbery of an individual and the robbery of a business without
resorting to any pre-defined test.219 In Wang, the Sixth Circuit noted that the
de minimis standard employed by the trial judge no longer applies to robbery
of an individual after Lopez.22 After a lengthy discussion of the effects of
Lopez on the court's analysis, 1 the Sixth Circuit moved to the second prong
of Jones analysis and scrutinized the relationship of the stolen money to
interstate commerce.222 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the stolen money,
216. See id. at 762 ("Several of our sister circuits have identified the difficulty inherent in
respecting the line between state and federal jurisdiction when applying the Hobbs Act to
defendants charged with the robbery or extortion of private individuals."); infra notes 218-35
and accompanying text (discussing circuit court cases cited or examined by Lynch court).
217. See United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that Fifth,
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted "Collins test" to determine existence of interstate
commerce connection in context of robbery of private individuals, and noting that Fourth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits acknowledge inherent difference between robbery of individuals and
robbery of businesses).
218. 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000).
219. See United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that defen-
dant's criminal activity did not affect interstate commerce within meaning of Hobbs Act simply
because he robbed restaurant owner of profits from restaurant doing business in interstate
commerce). In Wang, the Sixth Circuit considered the effect of robbing private individuals of
profits derived from a business operating in interstate commerce. Id. at 237-38. The defendant
in Wang entered the Tennessee home of a married couple who owned a Chinese restaurant
doing business in interstate commerce. Id. at 236. After assaulting the couple and repeatedly
threatening to kill them, he absconded with $4200, of which only S1200 actually belonged to
the restaurant. Id. After the district court convicted the defendant of a Hobbs Act violation, he
appealed, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that his robbery
affected interstate commerce in a legally cognizable manner. Id. at 237. The Sixth Circuit,
while recognizing the legitimacy of the de minimis standard for certain crimes, found that the
requisite showing for the robbery of an individual differs from that for the robbery of a business.
Id. at 238.
220. See id. at 239 (noting that "the Lopez Court declined to apply the aggregation
principle in conjunction with long chains of causal inference[s]" to find substantial effect on
interstate commerce and that piling of inferences would be requisite to establish jurisdiction).
221. See id. at 239-40 (noting that Lopez requires stricter standard than de minimis
examination). The Sixth Circuit cited Lopez and Morrison, but not Jones. This may be due in
part to the fact that the court was uncertain how to interpret the language of Jones in the context
of the Hobbs Act, given that the Supreme Court decided Jones only three months before the
Sixth Circuit decided Wang.
222. See id. at 240 (finding that stealing $1200 of restaurant's money from restaurant
owners did not implicate interstate commerce).
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by itself, had no effect on interstate commerce2? and that, without a further
showing, Lopez and Morrison prevented the court from assuming that such
robbery would have an effect on interstate commerce through nationwide
repetition of such acts." 4 Ultimately, the importance ofthe Sixth Circuit's use
of such analysis is two-fold; it indicates a willingness by a circuit court to
reexamine Hobbs Act jurisdictional claims in light of recent Supreme Court
precedent and, more importantly, it indicates that courts can apply effectively
the test set out in Jones, or at least a rough approximation thereof, in a Hobbs
Act setting.
The Ninth Circuit also cited the case of United States v. Diaz"' to illus-
trate a situation in which a sister circuit, post-Jones, adopted a formal test to
determine at what point the robbery of an individual affects interstate com-
merce in a federally cognizable manner under the Hobbs Act.226 In Diaz, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the three-
part test provided in United States v. Collins22 effectively differentiated
between the robbery of an individual and the robbery of a business.2" The
Collins court had held that robberies or extortions perpetrated on individuals
affect interstate commerce in three situations: first, when the crime depletes
the assets of an individual directly engaged in interstate commerce; second,
when the crime causes the individual to deplete the assets of an entity engaged
in interstate commerce; and third, when the crime victimizes so many people
or involves the loss of such a large amount of money that there will be a cumu-
lative effect on interstate commerce.229
223. Id. at 240.
224. See id. (emphasizing Supreme Court's warning about federal infringement on
traditionally state-prosecuted crimes, such as robbery, and focusing less on implications of
Lopez and Jones on aggregation as valid standard).
225. United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065 (1 1th Cir. 2001). In Diaz, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the Collins test was satisfactory for determining when the robbery of an individual
affects interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 1084. The defendants in Diaz,
practitioners of Santeria, orchestrated a crime spree that involved the kidnapping and torture of
several wealthy church patrons in an effort to extort money from them. Id. at 1075-82.
Ultimately, the court found that the Government proved that the defendants' actions substan-
tially affected interstate commerce. Id. at 1089.
226. See United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Diaz as recent
case adopting Collins test).
227. See United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99-101 (5th Cir. 1994) (establishing three-
part test to determine when robbery of individual implicates interstate commerce as defined in
Hobbs Act).
228. See Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1084-85 (adopting Collins test as suitable for situations
involving Hobbs Act as applied to robbery of individual).
229. See Collins, 40 F.3d at 100 (outlining three-part test for determining when robbery
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The Ninth Circuit, concluding that Lopez and Morrson mandate stricter
scrutiny of Hobbs Act prosecutions of robberies of individuals,' 0 adopted the
Collins test.23 Deciding that the Collins test provided the best possibility of
consistent application of a national law,232 the Ninth Circuit noted that the test
is useful in defining what constitutes a state offense2 3 and provides defen-
dants with a predictable way of determining which law enforcement body will
have jurisdiction over their alleged crimes. 4 By adding its name to the list
of circuit courts that differentiate between the robbery of an individual and
that of a business, the Ninth Circuit joins at least six other circuits that have
concluded that the jurisdictional reach of the Hobbs Act requires close scru-
tiny in order to avoid federal interference with state areas of concern."5 This
indicates a shift toward recognizing the first prong of the Jones test in the
perpetrated on individuals is prosecutable under Hobbs Act). In Collins, the defendant stole the
victim's cell phone, preventing him from making business calls and attending a business
meeting. Id. at 97-98. The Fifth Circuit found that the victim's nexus to interstate commerce
through his affected business was too tenuous for federal criminal prosecution under the Hobbs
Act. Id at 100.
230. See Lynch, 265 F.3d at 762 (finding need to delineate clearly the "distinction between
what is national and what is local" in situation in which there exists risk of federal intrusion into
state offenses (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000))).
231. See id. at 764 (joining Fifth Circuit in adopting Collins test).
232. See id. at 763 ("[Tlhe Hobbs Act has nationwide criminal application; as a matter of
fairness, defendants should be treated equally throughout the nation.").
233. See id. (finding Collins test effective method of defining "what might otherwise be
a never-ending catch-all for what should be state offenses").
234. See id. ("[T]he proposed test provides defendants with 'some means of knowing
which of the two governments' will have oversight over their actions." (quoting United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J. concurring))). This reason for adopting
the Collins test, while noble, may not have much practical value. The Ninth Circuit assumes
that the defendant will know the difference between federal and state prosecution as well as the
levels to which his conduct must rise to be subject to either. Because it is unlikely that a Hobbs
Act defendant will take the time to consider the ramifications of his criminal activity on
-interstate commerce, the only value in this rationale for adopting the Collins test, if any, lies in
the formulation of a post-arrest defense strategy.
235. Compare United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 238-40 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting need
to differentiate between robbery of individual and robbery of business, but offering no test to
apply routinely in such situations), and United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402, 1404-06 (4th
Cir. 1990) (same), and United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1023-25 (7th Cir. 1982)
(same), with United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758, 761-62 (9th Cir. 2001) (adopting three-part
test to determine when Government may prosecute robbery of individual under Hobbs Act), and
United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 2001) (same), and United States v.
Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99-101 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).
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Hobbs Act context,236 at least to the extent that these circuit courts require a
heightened showing of a nexus with interstate commerce."
Ultimately, Jones demands more. After examining the function of the
burned building, an exercise roughly analogous to examining the source of the
money in the Hobbs Act context, 238 courts are to proceed to Jones's second
prong - determining whether such function affects interstate commerce.2 39 In
the case of the Hobbs Act, this correlates to asking whether the function of
money affects commerce.240 Should courts be free to end their inquiry into the
level of effect on interstate commerce after determining whether the stolen
money or goods came from an individual or business? To do so would create
a two-tiered system requiring a higher level of proof to establish jurisdictional
links under the Hobbs Act for the robbery of an individual, but requiring no
236. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 854-55 (concluding that proper inquiry when considering
jurisdictional elements of federal arson statute is to examine first function of building itself and
then building's connection to interstate commerce).
237. Decisions retaining the de minimis standard in cases involving the robbery of an
individual demonstrate the importance of properly utilizing Jones. The decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Jamison, 299 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2002),
illustrates the extremes to which the de minimis standard can be stretched to support federal
jurisdiction over a Hobbs Act conviction. A jury convicted the defendant of a Hobbs Act
violation after he shot and robbed a drug dealer. Id. at 115. The victim, three-time convicted
felon Andre "Boogaloo" Porter, commingled proceeds from drug sales with receipts from a
legitimate clothing enterprise he owned. Id. at 116-17. At trial, the Government contended
that, because the money stolen "could have been" used to purchase cocaine, a "commodity" in
interstate commerce, the interstate element of the Hobbs Act had been satisfied. Id. at 117.
Thus, the Government argued that the robbery deprived the victim of his ability to buy an illegal
good theoretically moving in interstate commerce. Id. While one might view this robbery as
a social benefit considering the nature of the interstate product, the Second Circuit accepted the
Government's argument after noting that Lopez did not change its reasoning and expressly
rejecting the holdings in both Collins and Wang. Id. at 118-19. The court particularly focused
on Porter's statement that he intended to use the ill-gotten money to buy "drugs or clothing,
whatever." Id. at 119. In dissent, Judge Jacobs cited both Wang and Collins for the proposition
that the de minimis standard no longer represents good law when considering the robbery of an
individual. Id. at 122 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). Further, he noted the absurdity of resting a
federal conviction on the vague statement of a three-time convicted felon as to his intent when
disbursing his drug profits. Id. at 122-23 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
238. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing how test outlined in Jones
is equally effective when applied to jurisdictional analysis in Hobbs Act prosecutions).
239. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 854 ("The proper inquiry, we agree, 'is into the function of the
building itself and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce."'
(quoting United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part))).
240. See United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that Hobbs Act
presents difficulty in analyzing activities that necessarily implicate commerce).
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additional scrutiny for the robbery of a business.241 While courts should apply
the first prong of the Jones test rigorously, it serves as little more than an
indicator of when the court should use heightened scrutiny when examining
the nexus between the crime committed and interstate commere. 242 The real
examination of Hobbs Act jurisdictional elements occurs in the second prong
of Jones. Jones instructs lower courts to determine "whether [the] function
[of the burned building] affects interstate commerce."243 The parallel test for
the Hobbs Act would be an examination of "whether [the] function [of the
stolen money] affects interstate commerce." But how do courts define what
"affects" commerce under the Jones test?
To answer this question, the Jones Court turned first to the statutory
language of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).244 A similar look at the broad language of the
Hobbs Act gives courts little guidance regarding the limits of the statute's
applicability because it applies to anyone who "in any way or degree ob-
structs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or com-
modity in commerce, by robbery or extortion. 24' The statute's language is so
broad that, to paraphrase the Court in Jones, hardly a robbery in the land
would fall outside its scope.246 Such an expansive reading creates doubt about
the statute's constitutionality,247 and the Court has long noted the need to
avoid constitutionally suspect interpretations.24 Thus, the courts must define
241. The Collins test, for example, would satisfy this higher level of scrutiny for the
robbery of an individual. See discussion accompanying supra notes 210-37 (discussing
differing approaches, including adoption of Collins test, to raising level of scrutiny for connec-
tions between interstate commerce and robbery of an individual). However, it may lead to
untenable results. An example would be the case in which the theft of five dollars from a phone
company leads to no searching review of the connection between the crime and interstate
commerce, while the extortion of millions of dollars from a kidnaped businessman receives
heightened scrutiny with respect to the jurisdictional elements of the Hobbs Act.
242. See Lynch, 265 F.3d at 761-62 (stating that taking small sums of money generally
affects only victim, not national economy, suggesting that such behavior does not fall within
jurisdiction of federal statutes).
243. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 854 (outlining two-part test to determine whether owners
.used" burned property in interstate commerce).
244. See id. at 853-55 (discussing congressional meaning of words "used in" as set out in
federal arson statute).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000).
246. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 857 (commenting on expansive nature of federal arson statute
as proposed by federal prosecutors).
247. See id. (noting that in areas of traditional state concern, such as prosecution of
criminal activity, courts should treat interpretations of federal statutes allowing federal incursion
as constitutionally suspect without clear manifestation of congressional intent).
248. See id. ("[Wihere a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave
1499
1500 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1461 (2002)
the term "affect" in a manner consistent with the principles of federalism
espoused in Jones, as well as in Lopez and Morrison.
VI. Conclusions
One question raised by Jones and its predecessors that remains is whether
the de minimis standard as applied to robbery of a business is still good law.
Circuit courts addressing the question have held that it is.249 The de minimis
standard remains in effect even in the Fifth Circuit, which has engaged in
heated debate over the standard's validity."'0 Occasionally, circuit courts use
the aggregation theory to justify such a standard;2"' others simply exclude the
supporting aggregation rationale and immediately conclude that an offense
need have only a de minimis effect on commerce because Congress authorized
such a standard by exercising its full authority under the Commerce Clause.2" 2
But given the Supreme Court's limiting of congressional language in Jones253
and given the Court's warning to lower courts to draw a line between local
and national issues," 4 can circuit courts continue to justify basing federal
jurisdiction merely on a showing that the criminal activity has some nexus,
regardless how tenuous, with interstate commerce?
and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." (quoting United States ex reL Attorney Gen. v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909))).
249. See United States v. Lynch, 265 F.3d 758, 762-63 (9th Cir. 2001) (continuing, even
post-Jones and post-Morrison, to require only de minimis connection between criminal act and
interstate commerce); United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1269-71 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (same);
United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1085-86 (10th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v.
Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 238
(6th Cir. 2000) (same).
250. See United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 558-59 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
in commercial setting Jones and Morrison did not overrule precedent establishing de minimis
standard for effect on interstate commerce in Hobbs Act prosecutions).
251. See United States v. Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1273-75 (1lth Cir. 2001) (recounting
history of and modem practical application of aggregation theory).
252. See United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1087 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding de
minimis standard without discussing aggregation theory by noting Congress's intent to invoke
its full authority under Commerce Clause).
253. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 858-59 (applying constitutional doctrine in order to narrow
jurisdictional reach of federal arson statute).
254. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (finding that, to avoid unconsti-
tutional federal intrusion into local affairs, courts must maintain distinct boundaries between
federal and local criminal prosecutions); see also supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text
(examining federalism rationale underlying Jones decision).
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A. Application of the Jones Two-Part Test
Circuit courts often distinguish the Hobbs Act from the federal arson
statute and the statutes at issue in Morrison and Lopez by noting that robbery
is an inherently economic activity.255 But economic activity is whatever the
Supreme Court says it is. In Jones, the Supreme Court agreed that receiving
natural gas from out of state and using property as collateral to secure a loan
did not constitute a commercial use of the property.256 The effects were
simply too minimal. What about a gunman who takes $5000 from a depart-
ment store? Or $400 from a restaurant? Or $5 from a hotdog stand? At what
point does an individual robbery simply cease affecting interstate commerce?
Fortunately, the second prong of the Jones test helps lower courts make this
determination.
57
Adapting the second prong of the Jones test to Hobbs Act
prosecutions," 5 lower courts should ask whether the function of the robbed
commercial establishment has sufficient "effects" on interstate commerce.
25 9
If a court finds that the function inherently affects interstate commerce, then
the Hobbs Act applies to the robbery. But if the court finds that the function
of the robbed establishment did not inherently affect interstate commerce,
then the Hobbs Act could not reach such crimes.26
B. Non-Pretextual, Rational Basis for Aggregation
This application of the Jones test raises the question of how to determine
what type of establishment, through its function, affects interstate commerce.
This brings us back to Judge Higginbotham's dissent in United States v.
255. This distinction turns on the assumption that Congress may regulate anything having
to do with commerce.
256. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 855-57 (holding that, were Court to adopt Government's
evidence of "use" of property to receive natural gas and serve as collateral for loan from out-of-
state bank as proof of connection with interstate commerce, then robbery of virtually any
building in nation would be subject to federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
257. See id. at 854 ("The proper inquiry, we agree, 'is into the function of the building
itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce.'" (quoting
United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C. J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))).
258. See id. (focusing inquiry on whether damaged property "affects" commerce at
constitutionally cognizable level).
259. Id.
260. See id. (focusing on function of victim establishment rather than effect of criminal act
on victim establishment when examining connections to interstate commerce).
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Hickman.61 In Hickman, Judge Higginbotham argued for a "rationality in
aggregation" test,262 meaning that he would require Congress to "identify a
non-pretextual, rational basis for concluding that there are sufficient interac-
tive effects among activities to allow them to be aggregated."263 Under this
test, Congress would need to identify its reasons for believing that the prohib-
ited activity affects interstate commerce. 2"
Likewise, Lopez and Morrison serve as examples of Congress failing to
show a "non-pretextual, rational basis" for aggregating local criminal activity
sufficient to satisfy the interstate commerce requirement.265 In Lopez, Con-
gress included no evidence, either in the language of the statute or in its
legislative history, of the deleterious effects that guns in school zones have on
interstate commerce.2" Such findings, had they existed, might have estab-
lished a non-pretextual, rational basis on which to base federal legislation of
local crimes through the aggregation theory and might have overcome the
Court's reservations concerning the incursion of federal police powers into
areas of traditional state control.267 But, as Justice Rehnquist stated, "simply
because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. ' " The Court went on
261. See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (rehearing, en bane,
question of whether de minimis standard remains good law in Fifth Circuit).
262. See id. at 242 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (proposing that prosecuting local
robberies using aggregation theory violates constitutional bounds of federal government when
Congress has not provided rational basis for connecting such crimes to larger national problem).
263. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
264. Such rationale would, of course, be subject to review by the Supreme Court, which
would continue to examine the validity of congressional reasoning. See infra note 271 and
accompanying text (noting Supreme Court's zealous affirmation of its prerogative to decide
ultimately what constitutes interstate commerce).
265. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (noting that Congress
supported Violence Against Women Act with "numerous findings" regarding effect of gender-
motivated violence on interstate commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995)
(noting that Congress included no legislative findings in either Gun-Free School Zones Act or
its legislative history).
266. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 (noting lack of legislative findings in Gun-Free School
Zones Act). The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that Congress possessed enough
"accumulated institutional expertise regarding the regulation of firearms" that courts should
impute to the legislation some rational connection between guns in school zones and detrimental
effects on interstate commerce. Id. The Court went on to note that Congress has no duty to
include such findings, but such findings would have facilitated reviewing court's task of
examining the connection between the prohibited conduct and interstate commerce. Id.
267. See id. at 564 (detailing and dismissing Government's unsupported argument that
violence in schools threatens learning environment, leading to decreased national productivity).
268. Id. at 557 n.2 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452
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to reject the Government's post-hoc rationale for believing that guns in school
zones affect interstate commerce.269
In Morrison, the Court rejected the "non-pretextual, rational basis"
offered by Congress in an attempt to justify the implementation of the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act.27 Quoting from
Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court proclaimed itself to be the ultimate arbiter
of what legislation Congress permissibly may pass under its Commerce
Clause powers.27' The Court concluded that, although Congress had identified
a non-pretextual basis for believing that violence against women, repeated on
a national scale, negatively affected interstate commerce, such belief was
irrational. 22 Thus, the Court struck down the civil remedy provision of the
Violence Against Women Act.21
Further, evidence exists that the Supreme Court engaged in the non-
pretextual, rational basis test for aggregation in Jones. The Court found that
Congress had not stated clearly its intent to federalize the burning of purely
residential property. 4 The Court did not reach the broader question of which
types of commercial properties would fall permissibly under the federal arson
statute, although Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas in making clear that he
expressed no view on whether the statute would reach all buildings used for
commercial applications. 2"
U.S. 264,311 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)).
269. See id. at 563-64 (rejecting Government's "costs of crime" argument theorizing that
guns in school zones increase security costs and decrease effective learning, leading to de-
creased national productivity).
270. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (rejecting Government's argument that violence
against women substantially affects interstate commerce on grounds that link between violence
and commerce is too attenuated).
271. See id. at 614 ("[Wlhether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently
to come under the constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial
rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court." (quoting Heart
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring))).
272. See id. at 617-19 (finding congressional findings less credible because they relied on
disfavored theory that violence against women diminishes national productivity and increases
costs of medicine and insurance).
273. See id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring) (concluding that congressional power does not
extend to enactment of VAWA).
274. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 858 (stating that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly,
it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance" (quoting United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971))). And even if Congress does convey its purpose
clearly, the Supreme Court may still find that purpose illegitimate. See supra note 271 and
accompanying text (discussing Court's role as final arbiter of what "affects" interstate com-
merce).
275. See Jones, 529 U.S. at 860 (Thomas, J., concurring) (reserving judgment as to
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The benefit of combining the two-part Jones test with an insistence on
rationality in aggregation lies both in the ease of its implementation and the
clear delineation between state and federal concerns that results. In the
context of the Hobbs Act, lower courts would need only look to the legislative
history to determine whether Congress provided a non-pretextual rational
basis for subjecting the robbery of the commercial establishment in question
to the aggregation theory. Using Judge Higginbotham's rationality-in-aggre-
gation test, courts would attempt to determine whether Congress had estab-
lished such a foundation. Were the trial court to find that Congress provided
a non-pretextual, rational basis for aggregation, the Hobbs Act would then
apply. If not, the matter would remain under local jurisdiction. Further,
Congress would be free to add findings as to the effect of the robbery of
certain types of establishments on interstate commerce, the rational basis of
which would be subject to judicial review.276
A brief examination of the history of the Hobbs Act provides guidance
when examining Congress's original rationale for using an aggregation theory
to prohibit robbery. The modem version of the Hobbs Act sprang from the
Federal Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, the aim of which was to curb racke-
teering "in connection with price fixing and economic extortion directed by
professional gangsters." '277 In 1945, Congress enacted what is now known as
the Hobbs Act to curb the increasing problem of highway robbery,"s with the
impetus for the Act coming from the increased extortion and robbery of
interstate trucking by union members.279 The nature and operation of these
unions frustrated local law enforcement efforts, giving rise to congressional
whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) permissibly allows federal prosecution of arson of any buildings
used for commercial activity). Such a special exception leads one to believe that both Justices
seriously would consider rejecting the idea that the federal arson statute does, in fact, cover the
arson of all buildings used in commercial activity.
276. See supra note 271 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court's insistence that
it alone remain ultimate arbiter of whether activity has adequate effects on interstate commerce).
277. H.R. REP. No. 73-1833, at 2 (1934). The Act also targeted nationally known
Depression-era gangsters such as John Dillinger and George "Machine Gun" Kelly. 91 CONG.
REc. 11843, 11848 (1945).
278. See United States v. Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 528-30 (1942) (explaining evolution
of Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934); United States v. Woodruff, 941 F. Supp. 910, 916-17 (N.D.
Cal. 1996) (stating that Hobbs Act was intended to curtail highway robbery), vacated and
remanded, 122 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1997).
279. See 91 CoNG. REc. 11913 (1945) (statement of Sen. Whittington) ("The [Hobbs] bill
is to prevent a repetition of the physical violence by members of labor unions on those engaged
in interstate commerce."). The Supreme Court's decision in Local 807, in which the Court
found labor unions exempt from the 1934 Anti-Racketeering Act, prompted expansion of the
Hobbs Act. Local 807, 315 U.S. at 536. According to testimony, members of unions around
New York City charged $9.42 to "park" large trucks, and $8.41 for smaller ones. Id. at 526.
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action in the form of a federal statute.280 In short, Congress found adequate
reason to believe that threats to overland shipping interests constituted a threat
to interstate commerce. 28' Under the rationality-in-aggregation test, it would
be entirely plausible to conclude that Congress's informed determination that
the states cannot effectively address a specific type of criminal activity
provides a non-pretextual, rational basis for federal jurisdiction over that
crime.282
Utilizing the Jones test combined with a requirement of a non-pretextual
rational basis for aggregation clears up many of the nagging questions that the
current implementation of the Hobbs Act raises. No longer would circuit
courts need to agonize over the propriety of the de minimis standard. 3
Justice would cease to vary from circuit to circuit; a uniform treatment of
Hobbs Act offenders would emerge as federal courts across the nation em-
ployed the same test.
Perhaps more importantly, such a test draws a clear line between national
and local interests. By looking to the Hobbs Act itself and to congressional
intent, lower federal courts would prosecute only those crimes allowable
under the Supreme Court's Jones test. If lower courts are able to strike the
fine balance between national and local interests in the prosecution of crime
by applying the Jones test, the Supreme Court will lay to rest its fear of a
federal law usurping state criminal justice systems. And if the Jones test
functions as the Supreme Court intended, an even higher interest will be
served - that of justice.
280. See 91 CoNG. REc. 11917 (1945) (statement of Sen. Rivers) (asserting that farmers
"have had no protection under the laws of the state of New York. The Hobbs bill protects them
with the armed might of the Federal Government"). Senator Rivers defended the Hobbs Act
against claims that it impermissibly intruded on the rights of states to prosecute local criminal
activity, especially crimes committed by labor unions. 91 CoNG. REC. 11917 (1945) (statement
of Sen. Rivers). He claimed that the raison d'etre of the Hobbs Act sprung from the fact that
states, especially New York, could not, or did not, protect farmers from such highway extortion.
91 CONG. REc. 11917 (1945) (statement of Sen. Rivers).
281. 91 CoNG. REc. 11902, 11924 (1945) (statement of Sen. Rivers).
282. 91 CONG. REc. 11911 (1945) (statement of Rep. Jennings) ("[T]he States have not
been effectively prosecuting robbery and extortion affecting interstate commerce and the
Federal Government has an obligation to do so.").
283. See United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that Fifth
Circuit "agonized over the propriety of the gambit of prosecuting criminal conduct which has
historically and traditionally been prosecuted under the state system").
1505

